

## **Political Violence and Terrorism against Major International Sporting Events: A Chronology and Consideration of Mitigation Strategies\***

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### **Abstract<sup>2</sup>**

From local to global levels, Major International Sporting Events (MISEs) demand a multifaceted interweaving of levels, sectors, actors, and interests. Security planning with respect to possible political violence and terrorism remains a key issue for host governments of MISEs considering the scale of these events, the publicity they entail, and the political demands to prevent violence considered terrorism more generally. At the same time, a proportionate balance must be struck between providing safety and security and ensuring a festive and spirited atmosphere. This report considers the stakes involved for host governments, lays out a chronology of political violence and sport, discusses mitigation strategies, provides some thoughts on future MISEs, and identifies areas in need of future research. Concluding observations point to a need for further attention to one, the political context of violence and of MISEs, and, two, the increased insecurity related to sport facing local communities that are distanced from MISE venues.

**Key words:** Major International Sporting Event (MISE), political violence, context, security, sport, terrorism, chronology, Olympics, World Cup, mitigation.

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## Introduction

From neighbourhoods to international organizations, from economic regeneration to cultural initiatives, Major International Sporting Events (MISEs) demand an interweaving of levels, sectors, actors, and interests: Levels in terms of local, national, regional, and international actors; sectors in terms of political, economic, and social spheres; and interests in terms of the objectives that intersect different levels and sectors. Security planning with respect to possible political violence and terrorism remains a key issue for host governments of MISEs considering the scale of these events and the publicity that they entail. For MISE security planning a proportionate balance must be struck between providing safety and security and ensuring a festive and spirited atmosphere.<sup>3</sup> The dominant interpretation of violence labelled terrorism is that it is unarguably illegitimate. Thus the political demands to prevent violence considered “terrorism” thus maintains a salient influence over security decision-making. As seen in the UK National Risk Register,<sup>4</sup> other risks to safety and security such as infectious disease and accidents related to infrastructure are present. But for MISEs, it is the possibility and/or perception of “terrorism” as opposed to “serious crime” or “targeted disruption”<sup>5</sup> that frequently remains at the top of security agendas, as seen in the “London 2012 Olympic Safety and Security Strategic Risk Assessment (OSSSRA) and Risk Mitigation Process”.<sup>6</sup>

As explained by Richard Giulianotti and Francisco Klauser, “Threats of terrorism and political violence, for example, are often not only seen as to endanger the athletes, spectators, and local population but also as a symbolic and political embarrassment—and hence financial risk—for host nations and organizing institutions.”<sup>7</sup> Planning security for such a “known unknown”, or in many cases, an “unknown unknown”,<sup>8</sup> is based in exceptional levels of uncertainty with respect to threat identification. At the same time, this foundation of uncertainty can encourage the formation and justification of exceptional state powers in terms of the balance between security and civil liberties.

State and non-state officials reference the need for host governments to provide safety and security for MISEs as seen in the contracts between sporting federations and host governments, but there is no single agreement on how this planning should be engaged or managed. Alongside the need to balance security with festivity are a variety of stakes involved for the host government. “Stakes” in this sense are understood as the costs and benefits associated with a particular action in a given context. For example, the economic stakes of significant financial investment into putting on a MISE

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<sup>3</sup> Margaret Gilmore, “The Real Olympic Challenge: Security”, in “Counter-Terrorism in an Olympic Year: It Will Get Better Before It Gets Worse,” UK Terrorism Analysis, RUSI, no. 1 (2012), 6.

<sup>4</sup> National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies, 2012 edition, UK Cabinet Office [cited 9 January 2013]; available from <http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/resource-library/national-risk-register>.

<sup>5</sup> Evidence-based Olympics team, “Setting the Agenda for an Evidence-based Olympics,” *RAND* (Cambridge: RAND Europe, TR-516-RC (2007), 29.

<sup>6</sup> “London 2012 Olympic Safety and Security Strategic Risk Assessment (OSSSRA) and Risk Mitigation Process”, Summary Version 2 (January 2011), p. 8 [cited 20 November 2012]; available from <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/olympics/ossra-summary?view=Binary>

<sup>7</sup> Richard Giulianotti and Francisco Klauser, “Security Governance and Sport Mega-events: Toward an Interdisciplinary Research Agenda,” *Journal of Sport and Social Issues*, 34, no. 1 (2010): 52.

<sup>8</sup> Christopher Daase and Oliver Kessler, “Knowns and Unknowns in the ‘War on Terror’: Uncertainty and the Political Construction of Danger,” *Security Dialogue* 38 (2007): 411-434.

or the political stakes of achieving a successful legacy on the international stage. The stakes are relatively high for all MISEs, but the larger the event and audience, the higher the potential benefit and the higher the potential cost. In the “London 2012: Olympic and Paralympic Safety and Security Strategy”, the vision was explained as “To host an inspirational, safe and inclusive Olympic and Paralympic games and [sic] leave a sustainable legacy for London and the UK”,<sup>9</sup> with an overarching goal “To deliver a safe and secure Games, in keeping with the Olympic culture and spirit.”<sup>10</sup>

How do host governments balance safety, security, festivity, and celebration in planning MISEs? Who are the actors and what are the interests across the levels and sectors involved? An objective of this report is to respond to such questions through a nuanced critical analysis of political violence and MISEs. This requires a conscious attention to language, including that of “terrorism” and the implications this can have in terms of threat perception, security practice, and insecurity. The task of defining terrorism is an ongoing debate,<sup>11</sup> and the allocation of “terrorist” as a specific threat identifier is open to interpretation depending on the context within which it is used and who uses the term. Determining who is a terrorist is not a scientific categorization, but an interpretation and result of political practice. This is not to minimise the threat of violence identified as “terrorism”, but to underscore aspects of discourse and practice that may be unduly limiting in terms of what mitigation strategies are deemed politically acceptable. As such, terrorism should not be framed in security discourse and practice as a type of person, but as a method of political violence and form of communication.<sup>12</sup> People are not born “terrorists”,<sup>13</sup> and security strategies for MISEs will be most effective if they approach security as protecting against as possible acts of political violence instead of protecting against possible “types of people”. Instead of reference to “terrorists”, this report focuses on the political aspects of MISEs and possible terrorism-related violence.

A secondary clarification of language concerns the term “MISE”. Depending on how one defines “major” and “sport”, MISE could include a wide range of events. For this report analysis focuses largely on the Olympics and the FIFA World Cup. This is due to the scale of these events, the size of the audience beyond the physical site, and the amount of available research material. Leading up to the London Olympics it was estimated that there would be 10,000 police, 10,000 private security contractors, 13,500 military personnel including Special Forces, an amphibious assault ship on the Thames, and fighter jets on standby.<sup>14</sup> Planning for the London Games began in 2003, nine years

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<sup>9</sup> “London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Safety and Security Strategy,” UK Home Office (March 2011), 6.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 7.

<sup>11</sup> Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler, “The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16, no. 4 (2004): 777-794; Igor Primoratz, “What is Terrorism?” *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 7, no. 2 (1990): 129-138; Alex P. Schmid, “Frameworks for conceptualising terrorism,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16, no. 2 (2004): 197-221; Jenny Teichman, “How to Define Terrorism,” in *Terrorism*, ed. Conor Gearty (Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1996), 3-15 (originally published in *Philosophy* 64 (1989): 505-517).

<sup>12</sup> Anthony Richards, Pete Fussey and Andrew Silke, “Towards an understanding of terrorism and the Olympics,” in *Terrorism and the Olympics: Major Event Security and Lessons for the Future*, ed. Anthony Richards, Peter Fussey and Andrew Silke (Routledge: Abingdon, 2011), 4.

<sup>13</sup> Harmonie Toros, *Terrorism, Talking, and Transformation: A critical approach* (London: Routledge, 2012), 30.

<sup>14</sup> “Counter-Terrorism in an Olympic Year: It Will Get Better Before It Gets Worse,” UK Terrorism Analysis, RUSI, no. 1 (February 2012), 1.

ahead of the event, with the total Games cost around £8.921bn as of 23 October 2012.<sup>15</sup> Security costs were estimated to be £533m, with an extra £475m “budgeted to cover army, security services and police spending”.<sup>16</sup>

In terms of audience, the most watched sporting events in 2008 were the Beijing Olympics opening/closing ceremonies (778 million/984 million), Euro final (287 million), Champions League Final (208 million), and the Super Bowl (152 million).<sup>17</sup> In 2010, the World Cup was shown on every continent including Antarctica and the Arctic Circle, with 3.2 billion people (or 46.4% of the world’s population) watching at least 1 minute of coverage.<sup>18</sup> For the final between Spain and the Netherlands there were 619.7 million “in-home viewers”, a figure said “likely to have surpassed one billion when out-of-home viewers are included”.<sup>19</sup> For the London Olympics, 51.9 million people in the UK watched at least 15 minutes of the events (90% of the population),<sup>20</sup> over 219.4 people in the US watched some part of the events,<sup>21</sup> and an estimated 900 million people across the globe watched the opening ceremony.<sup>22</sup>

To investigate the interrelation of security and MISE planning This report considers the stakes involved for host governments, lays out a chronology of political violence and sport, discusses mitigation strategies, provides some thoughts on future MISEs, and identifies areas in need of further research. This enables a rigorous analysis, temporally situated perspective, critical approach to mitigation strategies, and space for a discussion of future MISEs.

## 1. The stakes for host governments

Hosting a successful Olympic Games or World Cup provides opportunities for a successful long-term legacy through, among other factors, the possibility of favourable international publicity, domestic economic investment, and social rejuvenation. For example, in the case of Beijing 2008 it has been said that China sought to “use the Olympics to enhance internal credibility and control, showcase its economic growth, delegitimize Taiwan, improve its international stature, extinguish memories of the

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<sup>15</sup> Owen Gibson, “London 2012 Olympics will cost a total of £8.921bn, says minister” *Guardian* [cited 10 November 2012]; available from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/sport/2012/oct/23/london-2012-olympics-cost-total>.

<sup>16</sup> “London Olympics 2012: where does the money come from - and where's it being spent?” *Guardian* [cited 10 November 2012]; available from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/sport/datablog/2012/jul/26/london-2012-olympics-money>.

<sup>17</sup> Andrew Silke, “Understanding Terrorist Target Selection,” in *Terrorism and the Olympics*, ed. Richards *et al.* (London: Routledge), 13-14.

<sup>18</sup> “Almost half the world tuned in at home to watch 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa,” *FIFA* (11 July 2011) [cited 14 October 2012]; available from <http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/archive/southafrica2010/organisation/media/newsid=1473143/index.html>.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> “London 2012 Olympics deliver record viewing figures for BBC,” *BBC News* (13 August 2012) [cited 20 December 2012]; available from <http://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/latestnews/2012/olympic-viewing-figs.html>.

<sup>21</sup> “London Olympics Ratings: Most Watched Event in TV History,” 13 August 2012, *The Huffington Post* [cited 20 December 2012]; available from [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/13/london-olympics-2012-ratings-most-watched-ever\\_n\\_1774032.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/13/london-olympics-2012-ratings-most-watched-ever_n_1774032.html).

<sup>22</sup> Avril Ormsby, “Olympics: London 2012 opening ceremony draws 900 million viewers,” *Reuters* (8 August 2012) [cited 20 December 2012]; available from <http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/268733/economy/business/olympics-london-2012-opening-ceremony-draws-900-million-viewers>.

1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, and establish the People's Republic of China (PRC) as a global player—a formidable list of objectives.”<sup>23</sup> At the same time, however, the failure of a host country to successfully manage a MISE has the potential to bring significant consequences, and hosting a MISE is not a guarantee of a successful legacy. Hosting a MISE provides a platform of political opportunities domestically and internationally, raising the stakes and incentives for host officials to ensure a highly successful and memorable event.

For this report stakes are specified in terms of sectors and levels: Sectors being social, economic, and political spheres, and levels being local, national, regional, and international arenas. These categories are not neatly separated. However, considering the complexity of MISE planning it is useful to approach security along these simplified analytical parameters. Thinking in these terms facilitates an analysis that acknowledges both broader issues and particular relations, from state commitments with sporting federations to local public-private partnerships. Host governments have to balance the demands of the International Olympic Committee Charter (IOC) with local constituents, domestic agendas, and international law. This balance has been referenced by past host officials, with respect to the “number of unique counterintelligence and security concerns” and need “to ensure the full and equitable participation of all accredited members of the Olympic Family in accordance with Olympic rules and applicable laws of the [host country]”.<sup>24</sup> Relations may be increasingly complex in the 21<sup>st</sup> century considering an acceleration of technology, communications, and economic interdependence. But the complex and consequential political interweaving of actors and interests crossing national and international levels is not, in essence, something new.

Individuals and neighbourhoods of host countries are influenced by MISE security measures from the earliest stages of planning and research on the economic benefits from MISEs are thus far inconclusive.<sup>25</sup> Potential disadvantages face local communities, with housing rights and security being one area of concern. As cited by the Centre On Housing Rights & Evictions (COHRE), the “Olympic Games alone have displaced more than two million people in the last 20 years, mostly the homeless, the poor, and the minorities such as Roma and African-Americans”.<sup>26</sup> Another report concluded that “mega-events, such as the Olympic Games, are often used as occasions for attracting investment and catalysing large-scale redevelopment. However, benefits of host city redevelopment as a part of the preparations for the Games are rarely shared equally by city residents, and the huge costs of constructing the ‘new face’ are borne largely by the poor and marginalised sections of society”.<sup>27</sup> Related to this were the “evictions and arrests prior to the Seoul, Barcelona and Atlanta

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<sup>23</sup> Victor D. Cha, “Beijing’s Olympic-Sized Catch-22,” *The Washington Quarterly* 31, no. 3 (2008): 107.

<sup>24</sup> Ronald Reagan, “Los Angeles Olympic Games Counterintelligence and Security Precautions,” National Security Decision Directive Number 135, System II 90346, Top Secret White House, Washington, D.C. (27 March 1984).

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Holger Preuss, Benoit Seguin & Norm O'Reilly, “Profiling Major Sport Event Visitors: The 2002 Commonwealth Games,” *Journal of Sport & Tourism* 12, no. 1 (2007): 5-23.

<sup>26</sup> “Mega events,” *Centre On Housing Rights & Evictions (COHRE)* [cited 9 January 2012]; available from <http://www.cohre.org/topics/mega-events>.

<sup>27</sup> “Fair Play for Housing Rights: Mega-Events, Olympic Games and Housing Rights,” *COHRE* (June 2007) referenced in “One World, Whose Dream? Housing Rights Violations and the Beijing Olympic Games,” *COHRE* (July 2008), 6 [cited 9 January 2013]; available from [http://www.cohre.org/sites/default/files/mega\\_events\\_-\\_one\\_world\\_whose\\_dream\\_july\\_2008.pdf](http://www.cohre.org/sites/default/files/mega_events_-_one_world_whose_dream_july_2008.pdf)

Games”.<sup>28</sup> In preparation for the 2008 Summer Olympic Games, Beijing residents had to acquire new provisional residence permits,<sup>29</sup> with one analysis citing that 1.5 million people were forced to move.<sup>30</sup> The development and gentrification aspects of MISE planning can exacerbate consequences of preventive security and counterterrorism measures like the creation of “suspect communities” and situations of insecurity.<sup>31</sup>

In preparation for the 1982 Commonwealth Games, Joh Bjelke-Peterson (Queensland Premier at the time) “introduced draconian laws primarily to prevent demonstrations by indigenous peoples during the SME [sporting mega event]”.<sup>32</sup> It is not just that this law was “draconian” in its banning of any assembly with more than three people, but that it remained in place for almost a decade after the Games and “resulted in hundreds of indigenous Australians being arrested”.<sup>33</sup> In the context of the 2004 Athens Olympic Games, one survey interviewing international visitors and Greek residents concluded that the latter group was more likely to perceive extra security as oppressive rather than helpful.<sup>34</sup> With respect to Chinese Olympic planning, “authorities reportedly usurped the passports of all Uighurs in advance of the Olympics and restricted access to the Tibetan side of Mount Everest as part of a clampdown on any protests during the torch relay starting in April 2008”.<sup>35</sup> Following the 2012 announcement of surface-to-air missiles on some residential buildings in East London, local residents pursued legal action due to their fear that such measures would increase their insecurity rather than security.<sup>36</sup>

Connected to the needs of local communities are requirements for host governments to meet the cultural ideals of sporting federations to ensure that the event is a festive celebration of sport. The Olympic Charter defines *olympism* as placing “sport at the service of the harmonious development of humankind, with a view to promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity”.<sup>37</sup> This emphasises a notion of “humankind” beyond national boundaries, asserting an inclusive participation irrespective of political affiliations. The FIFA World Cup espouses a similar perspective, stating that the World Cup is “a socio-cultural phenomenon and a powerful, unifying

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<sup>28</sup> Evidence-based Olympic Team, “Setting the Agenda for an Evidence-based Olympics,” 23 (With reference to to Shapcott, ‘Commentary on “Urban mega-events, evictions and housing rights: The Canadian case” by Chris Olds’, *Current Issues in Tourism* 1 no. 2 (1998): 195–196).

<sup>29</sup> Cha, “Beijing’s Olympic-Sized Catch-22,” 114.

<sup>30</sup> Giulianotti and Klauser, “Security Governance and Sport Mega-events,” 54–55.

<sup>31</sup> Mary J. Hickman, Lyn Thomas, Sara Silvestri, and Henri Nickels, ““Suspect Communities”? Counter-terrorism policy, the press, and the impact on Irish and Muslim communities in Britain.” Report of a research project: A comparative study of the representations of ‘suspect’ communities in multi-ethnic Britain and of their impact on Muslim and Irish communities 1974–2007,” ESRC, RES-062-23-1066 (2011) [cited 10 July 2011]; available from <http://www.londonmet.ac.uk/research-units/iset/projects/esrc-suspect-communities.cfm>; Mark McGovern and Angela Tobin, “Countering Terror or Counter-Productive? Comparing Irish and British Muslim Experiences of Counter-insurgency Law and Policy Report,” (Lancashire: Edge Hill University, July 2010); Heath-Kelly, Charlotte, “Reinventing Prevention or Exposing the Gap? False Positives in UK Terrorism Governance and the Quest for Pre-Emption,” *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 5 no. 1 (2012): 67–85.

<sup>32</sup> Giulianotti and Klauser, “Security Governance and Sport Mega-events,” 55 (with reference to G. Foley, (2008). “The Australian Labour Party and the Native Title Act,” in *Sovereign subjects*, A. Moreton-Robinson, ed. (pp. 118–139) (London: Allen & Unwin., 2008), 127).

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Tracy Taylor and Kristine Toohey, “Perceptions of Terrorism Threats at the 2004 Olympic Games: Implications for Sport Events,” *Journal of Sport & Tourism* 12, no. 2 (2007): 109.

<sup>35</sup> Cha, “Beijing’s Olympic-Sized Catch-22,” 114.

<sup>36</sup> “London 2012: Missile tenants lose legal ruling,” *BBC News* (10 July 2012) [cited 10 November 2012]; available from <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-18778723>.

<sup>37</sup> International Olympic Committee, “Olympic Charter,” Lausanne, Switzerland (8 July 2011), 10.

force”.<sup>38</sup> Governments draw on these aims in their bids to act as hosts, for example as seen in Qatar’s commitment to bring “greater unity and understanding between peoples from every continent” in their bid to host the 2022 World Cup.<sup>39</sup> However, such calls for inclusivity do not eliminate the fact that the majority of MISEs are defined by perceptions of identity that position athletes and spectators along separated *national* teams, anthems, flags, histories, and, sometimes, conflict.

Connected to possible tensions between political identification and aims for apolitical inclusivity are issues of security governance. Transparent and well-organized coordination between local law enforcement, national, and international actors is essential for effective planning.<sup>40</sup> Emergency response teams, intelligence sharing, and decision-making must efficiently manage and share resources across sectors and levels without becoming overly centralized or fragmented. Such a multi-agency approach is already at work in the security practices of many host countries, but differences remain.<sup>41</sup> As discussed by Mark Sparkman, what London had in its favour was “excellent law enforcement, security, and intelligence cooperation with a variety of nations”, whereas Beijing has been referenced as having been reliant upon domestic resources considering a “normal distrust” of external actors.<sup>42</sup>

Intertwined with multi-agency approaches are the contractual obligations between host governments and sporting federations. These contracts formalise the relationship between state and federation officials by positioning security and safety as the responsibility of the host government. For the 2012 London Olympics this responsibility involved a range of actors, including the London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games (LOCOG), Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA), police service, and “other key delivery agencies” such as the Secretary of State for Transport, the Minister for Security and Counter-terrorism, and Secretary of State for Culture, Olympics, Media and Sport.<sup>43</sup> Senior military officials also had central roles, and an additional 450,000 people estimated to have been accredited (vetted).<sup>44</sup> All of these actors held a certain liability for their respective roles, but the ultimate accountability rested with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Home Secretary, and the Prime Minister.<sup>45</sup> A core institutional connection linking actors across host government sectors was the Olympic Security Strategy Risk Assessment (OSSRA). This “process is managed by the Design Authority Team (DAT) within the Olympic Security Directorate (OSD)” and works alongside the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) in the Cabinet Office.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> “ALL IN ONE RHYTHM™ – the Official Slogan of the 2014 FIFA World Cup™” (no date listed) [cited 13 November 2012]; available from <http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/organisation/officialslogan/index.html>.

<sup>39</sup> BIDDERS FOR THE 2022 FIFA WORLD CUP, “Qatar” [cited 1 November 2012]; available from <http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/qatar2022/bidders/qatar.html>.

<sup>40</sup> Brian Michael Jenkins (RAND), “New Challenges to U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts: An Assessment of the Current Terrorist Threat Addendum,” Before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate (August 24, 2012), 2.

<sup>41</sup> “London 2012: Olympic and Paralympic Safety and Security Strategy,” 8.

<sup>42</sup> “Latest Olympics Security Snafu Won’t Be the Last,” *RAND Blog* (1 August 2012).

<sup>43</sup> “London 2012: Olympic and Paralympic Safety and Security Strategy,” 5-6.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>46</sup> “London 2012 Olympic Safety and Security Strategic Risk Assessment (OSSRA) and Risk Mitigation Process”, Summary Version 2 (January 2011), 8 [cited 20 November 2012]; available from <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/olympics/ossra-summary?view=Binary>.

Domestic initiatives such as the OSSSRA provide the core of resources for host governments, but organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU) and Interpol have also been involved in MISE security. For the 2004 Athens Olympics, NATO and EU provided beneficial support,<sup>47</sup> and Interpol's international criminal database has been a growing resource for MISEs, as has its Incident Response Teams/Major Events Support Teams (IMESTs):

The first IMEST was deployed to Portugal to assist Portuguese authorities with security during the 2004 UEFA European Football Championships. Since then, INTERPOL teams have been deployed to a total of 60 major events, and in particular to sports competitions on all continents, including the 2007 Cricket World Cup in the Caribbean, the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa and the 2011 Cricket World Cup currently taking place in India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.<sup>48</sup>

The largest IMEST to date was sent to South Africa ahead of the FIFA 2010 World Cup and provided 50 officers from 32 countries.<sup>49</sup> Increased support from international organizations may be interpreted as a challenge to national sovereignty, but this support is an opportunity for host governments to strengthen cooperation and international law.

From contracts between host governments and international sporting federations, to the relationships between local communities and law enforcement agencies, MISEs demand multi-level and multi-sector approaches to security planning.

## **2. A Chronology of political violence: temporal perspective**

This section is based on Internet searches, news reports, academic research, the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI), and the University of Maryland's START Program Global Terrorism Database (GTD). The detail of incidents that were identified through these searches is included in Appendix 1. The goal of this section is to describe the most significant attacks while providing a new analytic perspective on the role of context surrounding political violence, terrorism, and MISEs.

### **2.1 Key events<sup>50</sup>**

The modern Olympic Games have been in place since the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, the World Cup since 1930, and terrorism as a method of political violence as far back as history.<sup>51</sup> Intersections of

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<sup>47</sup> Will Jennings and Martin Lodge, "Security and risk management for sporting mega-events," draft of an article for *Risk and Regulation* (Winter 2008): 15.

<sup>48</sup> "Securing sporting events a global challenge, INTERPOL chief tells Qatar Security Conference" (9 March 2011) [cited 18 September 2012]; available from [www.interpol.int](http://www.interpol.int).

<sup>49</sup> "Rio 2016 security chief updated on law enforcement initiatives during INTERPOL visit," Media release (25 November 2011) [cited 4 October 2012]; available from <http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News-media-releases/2011/PR097>.

<sup>50</sup> Unless otherwise noted, in this section all chronological details come from the RDWTI and the GTD.

<sup>51</sup> For examples of literature on terrorism in different historical contexts, see Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, eds., *The History of Terrorism from Antiquity to Al Qaeda* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007); Richard English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), *Irish Freedom: A history of nationalism in Ireland* (London: Pan Macmillan, 2006), *Terrorism: How to respond* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Adrian Guelke, *The Age of Terrorism and the International Political*



violence and sport are not new,<sup>52</sup> and MISEs are inherently political in how “the Olympics and sport in general have long been the subject of political exploitation”.<sup>53</sup> When it comes to political violence associated with “terrorism”, however, databases such as the RDWTI and GTD, media reporting, and existing literature lead to a few specific events.

The first incident noted as terrorism targeting a MISE is the 5 September 1972 Munich Olympic attack by the Black September Organisation.<sup>54</sup> Eight attackers infiltrated the Munich Olympic Village, killed two Israeli athletes and took nine hostages before demanding that 200 Palestinians be released from Israeli prison. The West German government agreed to safe passage to Egypt, but a gunfight at the airport between security forces and the attackers led to all hostages and five of the attackers being killed, with the three remaining attackers then apprehended. According to the RDWTI, there were 11 fatalities resulting from the Munich attack,<sup>55</sup> and the GTD cites 16 fatalities.<sup>56</sup> Incidents related to Munich subsequently took place in Algiers (1972), Beirut (1976, 1979), and Warsaw (1981), but these were not associated with MISEs.

Five individuals distributing favourable Olympic Games tracts were injured by an unknown group in Paris in 1980, and the Amsterdam headquarters of the 1992 Olympic Games candidature committee was attacked with explosives in 1986 by the Into the Blue Commando of the Revolutionary Cells. In 1987 in Peshawar, thirteen were injured by a bomb in the main bus terminal during the world cricket matches held in Pakistan. In 1989 Jerusalem, three were injured after tear gas was fired during a celebration of the Jewish Olympic Games.

Moving into the 1990s, in 1994, Andrés Escobar was killed upon returning to Colombia after he scored on his own team during the 1994 World Cup. Seven were injured in Northern Ireland when actors from the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) attacked viewers of the World Cup final in a pub, and fifteen were injured and four killed when a grenade struck a football field where fans in Djibouti were also watching the world cup final. The year 1996 saw the second most frequently cited attack on a MISE, the Atlanta Summer Olympics attack by Eric Rudolph.<sup>57</sup> Rudolph’s 40-pound homemade device packed with nails that exploded in Atlanta’s Centennial Olympic Park injured 111 people and killed one.<sup>58</sup> In 1997, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) targeted the Russian Olympic Committee in Colombia, killing cyclist Vasili Lujkina. In Athens that same year, there was an

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*System* (London: Tauris Publishers, 1995); and Charles Townshend, *Terrorism: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

<sup>52</sup> David Keyes, “The Killing Fields: Political Violence on the Soccer Pitch”, *Culture of Soccer* (14 February 2007) [cited 20 November 2012]; available from <http://cultureofsoccer.com/2007/02/14/the-killing-fields-political-violence-on-the-soccer-pitch/>.

<sup>53</sup> Anthony Richards, “Terrorism, the Olympics and sport: recent events and concerns for the future,” in *Terrorism and the Olympics*, eds. Richards *et al.*, 17. Richards references US-China ping pong diplomacy in the early 1970s (p. 18) and the suspension of South Africa in light of apartheid from 1970-1988 (p. 19).

<sup>54</sup> See Appendix 3 that outlines the exact wording from Glen Levy, “Top 10 Worst Sport Terrorism Attacks,” *TIME Specials* [cited 1 September 2012]; available from <http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/completelist/0,29569,1882967,00.html>.

<sup>55</sup> Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents, *RAND* [cited 20 December 2012]; available from [http://smapp.rand.org/rwtid/incident\\_detail.php?id=939](http://smapp.rand.org/rwtid/incident_detail.php?id=939).

<sup>56</sup> START Global Terrorism Database [cited 21 December 2012]; available from <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197209050002>.

<sup>57</sup> RDWTI [cited 20 December 2012]; available from [http://smapp.rand.org/rwtid/incident\\_detail.php?id=34405](http://smapp.rand.org/rwtid/incident_detail.php?id=34405).

<sup>58</sup> GTD [cited 20 December 2012]; available from <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199607270003>. Richards *et al.* “Towards an understanding”, in Richards *et al.*, eds., 2011, p. 3.

explosive attack on the Greek Olympic committee by the Anti-Authority Group. Also in 1997 was the abandoning of the Grand National in Aintree, England following coded bomb warnings from the IRA.<sup>59</sup> In 1998, the firing of three trench mortars at Narita Airport by the Revolutionary Worker's Council (Karurokyo) were said to "may be related to the Nagano Winter Olympic Games".<sup>60</sup> A bomb was found in Paris this same year at France Telecom one month before the World Cup, but no one took responsibility. In July 1998, an unknown perpetrator set off two sequential explosives in Kampala, Uganda, killing one and injuring three who were watching the World Cup soccer final.

Moving into the 21<sup>st</sup> century,<sup>61</sup> on 1 May 2002, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) set off a car bomb outside Madrid's Bernabau stadium before the Champions League final between Real Madrid and Barcelona, injuring six.<sup>62</sup> On 8 May 2002, a suicide bomb went off on a bus outside the Karachi hotel where New Zealand's cricket team was staying for the Test Championships, killing fourteen and injuring over twenty.<sup>63</sup> In 2003 there were two attacks in Athens against political targets by perpetrators who "condemned the Olympic Games".<sup>64</sup> In 2004 there were ten politically strategic attacks in Greece with "fire or firebomb" or explosives, but no injuries or fatalities were reported.<sup>65</sup>

In June 2005, ETA set off a car bomb near the Peineta stadium that was under construction in light of the Madrid bid for the 2012 Olympic Games. In Iraq, there were seven separate incidents of violence with relation to "Olympic" from 2005-2006. All were linked to unknown perpetrators, and the majority used a combination of kidnapping and firearms. From these incidents five were reported killed, and most targeted athletes or athletic officials. On 4 July 2006 in Dusa Mareb, Somalia, four were injured and two killed when the group Islamic Tendency tried to stop a World Cup screening.<sup>66</sup>

In 2007 an unknown perpetrator injured nine when tear gas went off at a Hilton Hotel in Port of Spain during warm ups for the 2007 Cricket World Cup in Trinidad-Tobago. In 2008, the Dakar Rally was cancelled due to terrorist threats, while twelve incidents in China related to the Olympics were recorded. From these, 73 were injured and 32 were killed. Two attacks were linked to the Turkestan Islamic Party, but the others were all "other" or "unknown" actors. In terms of modus operandi, all were explosives except two armed assaults, one with a knife. In Iraq 2008, a suicide bombing linked to Al Qaeda near a crowd of soccer fans following a World Cup qualifier injured 34. In August of this year, an explosive by an unknown perpetrator killed two and injured four in Sochi, Russia. Unrelated to either the Olympics or the World Cup, but with significant consequence, a suspected Tamil Tiger suicide bombing near Colombo, Sri Lanka killed 12 and injured dozens at the beginning of a marathon.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> This was listed as number eight in Levy's "Top Ten" list.

<sup>60</sup> RDWTI [cited 10 October 2012]; available from [http://smapp.rand.org/rwtid/incident\\_detail.php?id=10754](http://smapp.rand.org/rwtid/incident_detail.php?id=10754).

<sup>61</sup> Levy reports how the U.S. team pulled out of the Ryder Cup following 11 September 2001, but in the author's view this is not related to an incident of terrorism around a MISE.

<sup>62</sup> Number six from Levy's "Top Ten" list. See also "Car bomb rocks Bernabeu," *Guardian* (1 May 2002) [cited 11 January 2013]; available from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2002/may/01/championsleague.sport4>.

<sup>63</sup> Number four from Levy's "Top Ten" list. See also "Fleming haunted by bomb blast", *BBC* (10 May 2002) [cited 12 January 2013]; available from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/cricket/1978761.stm>.

<sup>64</sup> RDWTI, search via <http://smapp.rand.org/rwtid/search.php>.

<sup>65</sup> See Appendix 1 for more detail.

<sup>66</sup> As referenced in the START GTD

(<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtid=200607040019>).

<sup>67</sup> Though the RDWTI cites 12 killed and does not specify injured, one news report cites 14 killed and 90 injured ("Sri Lanka coach, former Olympic marathon runner killed in suicide attack", Associated Press via

In 2009 in Lahore, Pakistan, a major attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team bus convey by coordinated armed militants with grenades, AK-47s, and a rocket launcher killed 7 and injured 8.<sup>68</sup> Two years later in July 2010 in Laki Marwat, Pakistan, 88 were reported killed and “dozens” injured when a suicide bombing went off at a daily volleyball match. Also in 2010, the Togo football team came under attack in Angola before the Africa Cup of Nations, though Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) later apologised for the attack.<sup>69</sup> Three incidents took place in Somalia in 2010 related to the World Cup: two involved kidnappings by Hizbul al Islam in private homes of World Cup viewers that left two dead, and one involved unidentified perpetrators who threw a grenade into a crowd watching the World Cup, killing one and injuring two. The single most damaging attack in terms of injuries and fatalities was a dual bombing in Uganda during 2010. Al-Shabaab attacked two groups of civilians watching the World Cup with improvised explosive devices, killing 71 and injuring 75.

In reflecting on this chronology, the majority of recorded incidents were dominated by acts of violence from local actors in areas distanced from actual MISE venues. This suggests that a lack of violence during a MISE is not necessarily indicative of a lack of insecurity related to the MISEs more broadly, as seen in the instances of violence against World Cup audiences in Iraq, Uganda, and Somalia, and against Olympic planning leading up to Athens 2004 and Beijing 2008.

## 2.2 Analysis

Considering the Munich attack and the Palestinian conflict, Rudolph and right wing political extremism, Greece and extremist left wing agendas, China and western minority groups, or Spain and ethno-national tensions, the majority of violence that has occurred around MISEs to date is politically complex and involves significant local components. Whether with respect to the 2009 cricket attacks in Lahore, or the 2010 attack on the Togo football team in Angola, recent acts of violence related to international sport were motivated in large part by particular issue-areas.<sup>70</sup>

Existing literature continues to cite the 1972 Munich Olympic attack and 1996 Atlanta Olympic attack as the “two most significant terrorist attacks against the Olympics”.<sup>71</sup> Both of these events are linked to political, social, and historical contexts.<sup>72</sup> In the case of Atlanta, Rudolph was a member of the fringe Christian fundamentalist group Army of God, and was involved in a series of attacks before and after the 1996 Olympics. The “lone attacker” profile of Rudolph is potentially less lethal

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ESPN (6 April 2008) [cited 12 January 2013]; available from <http://sports.espn.go.com/oly/trackandfield/news/story?id=3332232>).

<sup>68</sup> This was considered by Levy to be the “Top” terrorist incident against a MISE.

<sup>69</sup> FLEC leader Rodrigues Mingas stated: “This attack was not aimed at the Togolese players but at the Angolan forces at the head of the convoy,” Mingas told France 24 television.” (As cited in James Sturcke, Paul Myers, and David Smith, “Togo footballers were attacked by mistake, Angolan rebels say”, *Guardian* (11 January 2010) [cited 3 November 2012]; available from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jan/11/two-arrested-togo-football-attack>).

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

<sup>71</sup> Richards *et al.*, “Towards an understanding”, in *Terrorism and the Olympics*, eds. Richards *et al.*, 1.

<sup>72</sup> On context, terrorism, and conflict resolution see Harmonie Toros and Jeroen Gunning, “Exploring a Critical Theory Approach to Terrorism Studies,” in *Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda*, ed. Richard Jackson, Marie Breen-Smyth and Jeroen Gunning (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 87-108.

than well-resourced and centrally organised groups.<sup>73</sup> However, individuals acting on their own are also “perhaps the bigger threat”,<sup>74</sup> with “bigger” interpreted as a higher likelihood of occurrence.

The case of Munich was not a scenario of lone attackers but a relatively well-organised and resourced attack with distinct political influences. As discussed by Hafez and Rasmussen with reference to Merari, “Munich must be understood in the context of the ignominious defeat of Palestinian guerrilla factions based in Jordan at the hands of forces loyal to the Jordanian monarch, King Hussein”<sup>75</sup> during the September 1970 to July 1971 civil war in Jordan (known as Black September). The high-ranking intelligence officer and “mastermind” of the Munich attacks, Abu Iyad, worked to reassert Fatah’s position by competing “with his rivals within the PLO”.<sup>76</sup> The response to the Munich attack by Israel’s “Operation Wrath of God” exacerbated social and political tensions by engaging in “a deliberate and systematic campaign of assassination targeting all the individuals believed to be involved in the planning and carrying out of the Munich attack”.<sup>77</sup> Though the Munich attack was not successful in terms of the attackers’ demands, it was a success in that “Media attention during the operation, and Israel’s reprisals after Munich, drove many volunteers into Fatah and gave newfound legitimacy to an organization previously beset by factional infighting and second-guessing.”<sup>78</sup>

The attacks in Greece leading up to Athens 2004 and in China leading up to Beijing 2008 were largely linked to grievances that connected local and state actors.<sup>79</sup> A trial in Greece for members of the November 17 organisation combined with the pending Olympics to create an environment whereby actors could reach a new audience in communicating political messages. In the case of China, acts of violence were largely connected to western areas of the country, and included coordinated bombings on two buses (with a warning call to local residents prior to the explosions) and the targeting of police officers.

In expanding the chronological investigation to analyse a search of “soccer” without qualifiers such as “Olympic” or “World Cup”, 47 incidents were recorded in the RDWTI and GTD, detailed in Appendix 2. The majority of these were from unknown assailants, involved firearms or explosives, and took place in local contexts. From 2005 to 2008 in Iraq alone there were twenty incidents of terrorism reported that were associated with “sport”.<sup>80</sup> Through these attacks, in just three years, 175 were injured and 112 killed, the vast majority being civilians, including children.

The majority of recent insecurity from political violence and terrorism related to sport has been in the Global South.<sup>81</sup> The venues of the 2006 and 2010 FIFA World Cups in Germany and South Africa

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<sup>73</sup> Ariel Merari, “The Munich Olympics Attack, 1972”, draft manuscript, 12; Mohammed M. Hafez and Maria Rasmussen, “Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, Phase II,” Naval Postgraduate School Center on Contemporary Conflict, PASC Report Number 2012 003, Workshop Report (January 2012), 2.

<sup>74</sup> Gilmore, “The Real Olympic Challenge: Security”, 6.

<sup>75</sup> Hafez and Rasmussen, “Terrorist Innovations”, 5.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., 4. Again with reference to Merari, “the refusal of the Olympic Committee to include a Palestinian delegation in the summer games” was a contributing factor to the operation (p. 13).

<sup>77</sup> Richards *et al.*, “Towards an understanding”, in *Terrorism and the Olympics*, 2.

<sup>78</sup> Hafez and Rasmussen, “Terrorist Innovations”, p. 14.

<sup>79</sup> Fussey, Richards, and Silke, “Critical reflections on securing the Olympics: Conclusions and ways forward”, in *Terrorism and the Olympics*, 231-232.

<sup>80</sup> Through this search a conscious filter was used while interpreting the data considering the frequency of the term “sport-utility vehicle”.

<sup>81</sup> A point also made by Richards, “Terrorism, the Olympics and sport” in *Terrorism and the Olympics*, 29.

did not face direct attacks, but there was significant violence for audiences in Somalia (2006 and 2010) and Uganda (2010). In total these attacks killed 80 and injured 75, more than Munich and Atlanta combined. Through a search of the RDWTI and GTD for “sport”, the top ten attacks in terms of fatalities took place in Colombia, India, Iraq, and Uganda. Four of the top five were in Iraq, and a total of 66 were killed. All of the attacks involved the use of explosives or firearms, were connected to local targets, and most had a recent history of conflict (e.g. Iraq, Chechnya, Pakistan, Uganda, Indonesia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina).

To identify other attacks that may be associated with sporting events, a search of “stadium” led to 59 reported incidents. Three of the top ten incidents in terms of fatalities were again in Iraq, and only one took place before 2000. In 2011, 75% of attacks connected to sport were in the “Near East” or “South Asia”.<sup>82</sup> The majority took place in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan, accounting for 85% of attacks in the two regions and 64% worldwide.<sup>83</sup> In cases that included religious affiliation in casualty identification, Muslims suffered 82-97% terrorism-related fatalities the past 5 years going back from 2011, and Muslim majority countries suffered the most.<sup>84</sup>

The modus operandi of “terrorist incidents” around MISEs noted from the RDWTI and GTD is dominated by what may be considered conventional weapons<sup>85</sup> that can have significant consequences, as seen in the 2008 Mumbai attacks that left at least 180 dead and hundreds wounded.<sup>86</sup> Having emergency services in place for the possibility of large-scale attacks is prudent,<sup>87</sup> but the risk from non-conventional weapons frequently associated with mass casualty attacks has been referenced as easy to overestimate.<sup>88</sup> Even relatively well-resourced and organised groups such as Al Qaeda have been discussed as uninterested in non-conventional weapons, in part due to their social and political costs and the need to maintain a particular image for their supporters.<sup>89</sup> Actors engaged in terrorism “must behave in an acceptable manner or else they will be rejected by their supporters (and potential supporters) and thus ruined”,<sup>90</sup> and “one of the calculations that terrorist organisations have to make” is if it would be counterproductive or ineffective “to their cause to attack the Olympics itself (directly or indirectly)”.<sup>91</sup> Groups “like Hezbollah and Hamas have had very real domestic and political goals that arguably placed some restriction on the level of violence that

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<sup>82</sup> “2011: The National Counterterrorism Center: Report on Terrorism,” National Counterterrorism Center, Office of the Director of National Intelligence (12 March 2012), 9.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid., 14.

<sup>85</sup> The terms “non-conventional” and “conventional” are used rather than “CBRN” or “WMD” in light of the varying definitions that come from the latter’s usage in different places.

<sup>86</sup> “Nearly 180 killed in Mumbai attacks,” *Amnesty International* [cited 20 December 2012]; available from <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/nearly-180-killed-mumbai-attacks-20081201>.

<sup>87</sup> Richards, “Terrorism, the Olympics and sport,” in *Terrorism and the Olympics*, 15.

<sup>88</sup> Brian Michael Jenkins, “Redefining the Enemy: The World Has Changed, But Our Mindset Has Not,” *RAND Review* (Spring 2004), 1.

<sup>89</sup> Hafez and Rasmussen, “Terrorist Innovations”, 21; James Robertson (written for Dr Mike Bourne), “How Appealing are CBRN Weapons to Terrorist Groups?” *e-International Relations* (April 2011) [cited 2 January]; available from <http://www.e-ir.info/2011/07/26/how-appealing-are-cbrn-weapons-to-terrorist-groups/>.

<sup>90</sup> Silke, “Understanding Terrorist Target Selection,” in *Terrorism and the Olympics*, 9 (with reference to W. Enders and T. Sandler, “The Effectiveness of Antiterrorism Policies: a Vector-Autoregression-Intervention Analysis,” *American Political Science Review* 87, no. 4 (2003): 829-844.

<sup>91</sup> Richards, “Terrorism, the Olympics and sport,” in *Terrorism and the Olympics*, 27.

they were willing to perpetrate”.<sup>92</sup> As discussed by Louise Richardson, “terrorists” are human beings who have to make decisions that take social and political relations into account.<sup>93</sup>

### 2.3 Summary

A key observation from reviewing acts of political violence and sport is that despite MISEs being potentially high value targets considering the large audience and symbolism involved, the number of incidents or known thwarted plots is very small. A July 2012 START reported that:

Overall, the locations of the Olympic Games are quite safe with respect to terrorism. As reported in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), for five venues no terrorist attacks were reported either during the Olympics Games, six months prior to their commencement, or during the same time period in the previous year. These locations include Japan 1972, Canada 1976, Soviet Union 1980, Yugoslavia 1984 and Australia 2000. Additionally, in South Korea and Canada in 1988, Japan in 1998, Greece in 2004 and Canada 2010, there were no fatal attacks recorded during any of the time periods we examined.<sup>94</sup>

More broadly, in the National Counterterrorism Center’s 2011 annual report from the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence there was no reference to “sport”,<sup>95</sup> and no significant plot was avowedly discovered in Athens 2004, Beijing 2008,<sup>96</sup> or London 2012. In looking at general statistics on terrorism, from 2010 to 2011 the total number of worldwide attacks dropped almost 12% (29% if from 2007) including a decrease in attacks on public places,<sup>97</sup> with suicide attacks 2.7% of overall attacks.<sup>98</sup> Compared with worldwide trends of terrorism, attacks around the Olympics were in line with a general increase in violence from the 1970s-early 1990s, decrease in violence from the mid-1990s and early 2000s, and increase in violence in the mid-2000s:<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>92</sup> Richards *et al.*, “Towards an understanding”, in *Terrorism and the Olympics*, 4.

<sup>93</sup> Louise Richardson, *What Terrorists Want* (London: John Murray Publishers, 2006), 7.

<sup>94</sup> “Terrorism and the Olympics”, START: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Background Report, “primary authors of this report are Erin Miller and Tiara Giddings” (July 2012), 2.

<sup>95</sup> “2011: The National Counterterrorism Center: Report on Terrorism”.


<sup>96</sup> Afzal Ashraf, “Al Qaeda and the London Olympics”, in *Terrorism and the Olympics*, 42.

<sup>97</sup> “2011: The National Counterterrorism Center: Report on Terrorism,” 16 (There was an increase on energy infrastructure from 299 attacks in 2010 to 438 in 2011 (Ibid.)).

<sup>98</sup> 21% of all fatalities (Ibid., 13).

<sup>99</sup> “Terrorism and the Olympics,” 2.

Figure 1: Terrorist Attacks in Olympic Host Countries



As concluded by the authors, “no clear pattern emerges regarding the relative lethality of attacks that take place in the context of the Olympics”.<sup>100</sup>

Despite no clear pattern connecting MISEs and terrorism, this threat remains high on host government security agendas. It is not that possible insecurity related to political violence identified as terrorism does not exist. Rather, that the amount of attention given to terrorism over other threats is partly the result of interpretive processes of threat identification and levels of risk. The most lethal incident during a single sporting event was not due to terrorism but a stadium structure and crowd management system that had fatal consequences.<sup>101</sup> Known as the Hillsborough disaster of 15 April 1989, during the FA Cup semi-final match between Nottingham Forest and Liverpool in Sheffield, UK, over 200 people were injured and 96 were killed when fans attending the match were fatally crushed.<sup>102</sup> The earlier 29 May 1985 “Heysel disaster” in Brussels during the European Cup final between Liverpool and Juventus led to 39 people being killed in a stampede and was followed by a “five year ban of any English club to exist in European football competitions”.<sup>103</sup> Though these are not terrorist incidents, they provide an important source of perspective for sport security more generally.

In considering this brief summary, the chronology of political violence and sport in section 2.1, and chronological analysis in 2.2, we see a low number of incidents targeting actual MISE sites, and relatively consistent political and social element in the incidents that have occurred. This suggests that insecurity related to terrorism and sport is higher for two areas: one, local events that are

<sup>100</sup> Ibid.

<sup>101</sup> The investigation is on-going.

<sup>102</sup> Stacey A. Hall, “An Examination of British Sport Security Strategies, Legislation, and Risk Management Practices”, *The Sport Journal* 13, no. 2 (2010) [cited 10 October 2012]; available from <http://thesportjournal.org/article/examination-british-sport-security-strategies-legislation-and-risk-management-practices>, p. 1.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

unrelated to the Olympics/World Cup, and, two, Olympic/World Cup audiences distanced from MISE venues.

### 3. Political violence, sport, and mitigation

It is important for security to be planned in conjunction with an attention to local contexts and existing grievances. The responsibility for host governments to ensure safety and security during MISEs considering the stakes, sectors, and levels involved demands that government officials pursue a multidimensional approach to security. Focusing on context is not to ignore security concerns, but to reorient perspectives to the complicated social and political aspects of violence considered terrorism. This section will first examine some conventional mitigation strategies before going on to incorporate the role of political context.

#### 3.1 Conventional approaches

The Beijing Olympics were estimated to have around 110,000 security personnel, and for the London Olympics it was stated that the London Metropolitan Police Service asked to hire “6,000-7,000 more officers specifically for the 2012 Olympics”.<sup>104</sup> In terms of cost, security figures for the Olympics rose through the 1990s and then “ballooned” following 11 September, with Beijing (albeit an “exceptional case”) costing US \$6.5 billion,<sup>105</sup> compared to the London Olympics that were estimated to cost £533m (with an additional £475m budgeted).<sup>106</sup> In July 2012 David Livingstone, an associate fellow at Chatham House,<sup>107</sup> explained that “The Olympic Games security system, albeit presenting challenges simply related to sheer scale, is an extension to the established way of 'doing security' in the UK.”<sup>108</sup> Thus, much security planning around MISEs is linked to pre-existing security practices, and has been categorised as: “(1) Communication and Notification, (2) Planning and Preparedness, (3) Access Control, (4) Surveillance and Inspection.”<sup>109</sup> “Sport-specific security measures” have been further specified as “(1) conducting security assessments, (2) increasing perimeter security, (3) enhancing detection monitoring capabilities, (4) establishing access control, and (5) reinforcing employee procedures to ensure knowledge of emergency protocol.”<sup>110</sup> Leading into the London Olympics, the UK government’s strategy was allocated across four stages: phase 1 (design, plan and build), phase 2 (overlay and testing), phase 3 (games time starting with Olympic torch relay), and phase 4 (recovery/decommissioning).<sup>111</sup>

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<sup>104</sup> Giulianotti and Klauser, “Security Governance and Sport Mega-events,” 50.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

<sup>106</sup> “London Olympics 2012: where does the money come from - and where's it being spent?” *Guardian* (26 July 2012) [cited 10 November 2012]; available from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/sport/datablog/2012/jul/26/london-2012-olympics-money>.

<sup>107</sup> Livingstone, <http://www.chathamhouse.org/about-us/directory/70655>.

<sup>108</sup> “Security at the Olympics: A System Designed to Cope,” Chatham House, Wednesday 18 July 2012.

<sup>109</sup> Stacey Hall, Lou Marciani and Walter Cooper, “Sport Venue Security: Planning and preparedness for terrorist-related incidents,” *The SMART Journal* 4, no. 2 (2008): 10 (with reference to DHS.gov, 2004).

<sup>110</sup> Ibid.

<sup>111</sup> London 2012: Olympic and Paralympic Safety and Security Strategy, 8.



A central aspect of mitigation for MISEs is being prepared for the extra capacity of these events. A core area of concern here is transportation and critical infrastructure. But in terms of long-term conflict resolution, providing emergency preparedness may only be a short-term suspension of violence or minimisation of destruction. The “look and feel”<sup>112</sup> of security was a consideration for the London Olympics, and “Images of a fortress around the Olympic venues” would not have matched the vision of host governments or sporting federations.<sup>113</sup> A core question for the London Olympics was “How can London deliver on the demands for a secure Games while also respecting the freedoms of participants, organisers and spectators?”<sup>114</sup> The “vision” for London was not only “To host an inspirational, safe and inclusive Games and leave a sustainable legacy for London and the UK”, but “To deliver a safe and secure Games, *in keeping with the Olympic culture and spirit* [emphasis added].”<sup>115</sup>

During the event, intelligence briefings, adequate numbers of security personnel, and venue protection are prioritised. The host government is responsible for security outside all of the venue structures, security inside the parameters of the event is the responsibility of the local organising committee and any public/private security partnerships they have established in line with the IOC charter. For the London Olympics, LOCOG managed core venue security through Venue Security Managers, but the military was positioned to provide additional support. The total venue force was estimated to be 23,700, with military support estimated at 3,500 initially but growing to 7,500 for the 17 days of actual events.<sup>116</sup> In light of the failure of the commercial security contractor GS4 to provide adequate security personnel, the British military then stepped in. Thus while private security contractors may be increasingly attractive, and necessary, there is no guarantee that capacity can be met considering the scale of MISEs.

New technology may fit “neatly with the IOC’s demands to prioritise the sporting event over the policing spectacle”,<sup>117</sup> but technology’s effectiveness is “determined in relation to the human contexts it functions within”.<sup>118</sup> Successful governance means integrating local, national, regional, and international actors and interests: Law enforcement agencies have to coordinate with military actors, local Olympic organising committees with the IOC Executive Board, state officials with international law, and public officials with private actors.<sup>119</sup> Underlying security governance is uncertainty. References to how “security requirements...must be developed in the face of uncertainty”<sup>120</sup> is not particular to MISEs, with a general growth in risk-oriented approaches from the late 20<sup>th</sup> century on.<sup>121</sup> As explained by Richard Giulianotti, “risk” is “a quintessentially modern

<sup>112</sup> London 2012: Olympic and Paralympic Safety and Security Strategy.

<sup>113</sup> Steve Swain, “Securing the transport system,” in *Terrorism and the Olympics*, 77.

<sup>114</sup> Evidence-based Olympic Security Team, “Setting the Agenda for an Evidence-based Olympics,” x.

<sup>115</sup> London 2012: Olympic and Paralympic Safety and Security Strategy, 6-7.

<sup>116</sup> General Sir Nick Parker (Commander of Land Forces), “Practitioner’s View”, in “Counter-Terrorism in an Olympic Year: It Will Get Better Before It Gets Worse,” 10.

<sup>117</sup> Richards *et al.*, “Towards an understanding”, in *Terrorism and the Olympics*, 8.

<sup>118</sup> Pete Fussey, “Surveillance and the Olympic spectacle”, in *Terrorism and the Olympics*, 109; Jeremy M. Wilson, Brian A. Jackson, Mel Eisman, Paul Steinberg, K. Jack Riley, “Securing America’s Passenger-Rail Systems,” RAND (2007).

<sup>119</sup> Mark Sparkman, “Latest Olympics Security Snafu Won’t Be the Last” *RAND Blog* (1 August 2012); London 2012: Olympic and Paralympic Safety and Security Strategy, 11.

<sup>120</sup> Evidence-based Olympic Security Team, “Setting the Agenda for an Evidence-based Olympics,” 49.

<sup>121</sup> Cf. Jon Coaffee, *Terrorism, Risk and the Global City: Towards Urban Resilience* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009); Richard Giulianotti, “Risk and Sport: An Analysis of Sociological Theories and Research Agendas,” *Sociology of Sport Journal* 26 (2009): 540-556; L. Amore and M. de Goede, M., eds., *Risk and the War on Terror*

construct; that is, risk calculations guide particular human interventions within contexts of generalized uncertainty.”<sup>122</sup>

The centrality of “risk” and uncertainty can be seen in the OSSSRA that depended upon a risk typology to meet core objectives such as “Protect; Prepare; Identify and Disrupt; Command, Control, Plan and Resource; and Engage”, incorporating the table below as a guide for governing mitigation and security strategies:<sup>123</sup>

Protect	Prepare	Identify and Disrupt	Command, Control, Plan and Resource
<b>People</b> Personnel security Accreditation VIP protection <b>Venue</b> Site and venue security CBRNE <b>Non-venue</b> Transport security Border security CCTV	Olympic resilience Specialist response COSI	Olympic intelligence Covert Serious and organised crime Volume crime Automatic Number Plate Recognition	<b>Command and Control</b> National coordination Operational control infrastructure Airwave <b>Resources</b> Demand and resource Training Operational logistics infrastructure
<b>Engage</b>			
International relations Community relationships Prevent Industry			

To navigate uncertainty considering the accelerating complexity of relations between sectors and levels, in part due to changing communications and technology, some research has suggested hybridized,<sup>124</sup> “portfolio”,<sup>125</sup> or “consequence-prevention”<sup>126</sup> approaches. An example given of a portfolio approach for aviation security is how “traditional preventive measures (e.g., prescreening passengers for air transport) could be combined with measures such as strengthening airframes or placing checked bags and other cargo in containers reinforced to withstand the effects of a bomb detonation”.<sup>127</sup> These efforts combine multiple conventional tactics, but do not provide for a politically nuanced approach necessary for longer-term security.

(Abingdon: Routledge, 2008). For a practitioner’s view on risk and counterterrorism practice see David Omand, *Securing the State* (London: Hurst, 2010).

<sup>122</sup> Richard Giulianotti, “Risk and Sport: An Analysis of Sociological Theories and Research Agendas”, *Sociology of Sport Journal* 26 (2009): 541.

<sup>123</sup> London 2012 Olympic Safety and Security Strategic Risk Assessment and Risk Mitigation Process, 2, 14.

<sup>124</sup> Jennings and Lodge, “Security and risk management,” 4.

<sup>125</sup> Brian A. Jackson, “Consequence Prevention: A New Model for Addressing Uncertainty About Terrorist Threats,” *RAND Policy Brief*, Homeland Security (2008).

<sup>126</sup> Brian A. Jackson, “Marrying Prevention and Resiliency Balancing Approaches to an Uncertain Terrorist Threat,” *RAND* (2008).

<sup>127</sup> Ibid.

Attention to critical infrastructure,<sup>128</sup> public-private security partnerships,<sup>129</sup> security vetting,<sup>130</sup> and intelligence sharing<sup>131</sup> are part of providing a safe and secure MISE. But to not incorporate the deeper contexts of possible violence is unnecessarily limiting. Security by/in design,<sup>132</sup> security capabilities,<sup>133</sup> inter-agency cooperation,<sup>134</sup> and intelligence coordination<sup>135</sup> may be important in varying degrees, but each of these strategies is faced by the issue of displacement.<sup>136</sup>

Displacement is defined as when “one security risk is mitigated, another blind spot or vulnerability is created, accentuated or overlooked.”<sup>137</sup> In one study displacement attacks were found “to be almost 100%”, indicating that even when a security measure stopped an actor from engaging in their initial plan, they still attacked in an alternative manner and/or location.<sup>138</sup> A suggested response to displacement is often a bolstering of existing strategies, not a reorientation of approach.<sup>139</sup> The risk of displacement underscores that no matter how well resourced or sophisticated a conventional strategy may be, it will not guarantee safety or security from political violence and terrorism. Road blocks may prevent vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (“VIEBs”) from reaching a specific venue, and steel and concrete barriers may absorb an explosion to prevent full destructive capability.<sup>140</sup> But such strategies will not eliminate the consideration or intent of an actor to use violence as a means to communicate a message.<sup>141</sup>

Ensuring that resources are in order considering the scale of MISEs, the security vetting process is effectively managed, emergency personnel and volunteers are given live test runs, and local communities are engaged with and consulted, are all aspects of security planning for MISEs.<sup>142</sup> Stricter security measures have been in force since the Munich attacks, as explained by Taylor and

<sup>128</sup> Wilson *et al.*, “Securing America’s Passenger-Rail Systems”.

<sup>129</sup> David Evans, “The role of the private security industry,” in *Terrorism and the Olympics*; London 2012: Olympic and Paralympic Safety and Security Strategy; Gilbert James, “Drawing Right Lessons from the Olympic Security Debacle,” *RAND* (25 July 2012).

<sup>130</sup> London 2012: Olympic and Paralympic Safety and Security Strategy, 5.

<sup>131</sup> Jennings and Lodge, “Security and risk management”; Evidence-based Olympic Security Team, “Setting the Agenda for an Evidence-based Olympics.”

<sup>132</sup> Coaffee, *Terrorism, Risk and the Global City*; Coaffee, “Strategic security planning and the resilient design of Olympic sites”, in *Terrorism and the Olympics*, 120; Stacey A. Hall, “An Examination of British Sport Security Strategies, Legislation, and Risk Management Practices”, *The Sport Journal* 13, no. 2 (2010) [cited 10 October 2012]; available from <http://thesportjournal.org/article/examination-british-sport-security-strategies-legislation-and-risk-management-practices>.

<sup>133</sup> Evidence-based Olympic Security Team, “Setting the Agenda for an Evidence-based Olympics”.

<sup>134</sup> “shared ethos...common doctrine...unified command model,...compatible and reliable communications systems...shared language...common equipment...common standards of professional practice... All supported through a process of continuous capability building by: shared training and exercising...shared operational experience through working together...shared learning and debriefing” (Keith Weston, “The challenge of inter-agency coordination”, in *Terrorism and the Olympics*, 181).

<sup>135</sup> Evidence-based Olympic Security Team, “Setting the Agenda for an Evidence-based Olympics,” 61.

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*, xv; Pete Fussey, “Surveillance and the Olympic spectacle”, in *Terrorism and the Olympics*, 107; Coaffee, “Strategic security planning,” 127.

<sup>137</sup> Jennings and Lodge, “Security and risk management,” 2.

<sup>138</sup> Andrew Silke, “Understanding Terrorist Target Selection,” in *Terrorism and the Olympics* (with reference to Enders and Sandler, 2003), 25.

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*, 26.

<sup>140</sup> Wilson, *et al.*, “Securing America’s Passenger-Rail Systems,” 53.

<sup>141</sup> Jackson, “Marrying Prevention,” 6.

<sup>142</sup> Brent W. Ritchie, Richard Shipway & Bethany Cleeve, “Resident Perceptions of Mega-Sporting Events: A Non-Host City Perspective of the 2012 London Olympic Games,” *Journal of Sport & Tourism* 14, no. 2-3 (2009): 143-167.

Toohey with reference to Sanan, but this has not prevented insecurity.<sup>143</sup> The greatest potential to ensure safety and security around MISEs rests in mitigation strategies that take social, political, and historical contexts into account alongside considerations of conventional security measures and emergency preparedness.

### 3.2 Reorienting mitigation perspectives

Whether in considering how athletes and fans around MISEs identify with a national team, or that terrorism is intertwined with political communication, it is impossible to separate security from the social and political contexts of violence and MISEs.<sup>144</sup> Archived reports as far back as 1963 referencing the Games for the Newly Emerging Forces and Indonesia's "ability to organize international games in her multimillion dollar sports complex which were attended by so many countries in defiance of the "imperialist West", reveal how MISEs are forums to communicate political messages to an international audience.<sup>145</sup> The Cold War, apartheid, and China-Taiwan relations are all examples of political influences on participation, or not, in the Olympic Games.<sup>146</sup>

Security strategies focus on conventional measures, but instead need to be sensitive to existing grievances and political contexts to avoid counter-productive consequence. Instead of referring without question to "terrorists", host governments should reorient perspectives on "possible threats of insecurity" to position "terrorism" as an *act* of political violence, not an actor.<sup>147</sup> An explicit terminology of "terrorist" can lead to marginalization, alienation, and the creation of suspect communities, all of which increase insecurity.<sup>148</sup> As explained by Margaret Gilmore, "Mitigating potential panic caused by extra security activity will be a challenge for the services keen to ensure specific communities do not feel an injustice has been done, which could trigger further trouble in the form of public disorder or even violence."<sup>149</sup>

Recalling incidents around Athens 2004 and Beijing 2008, violence connected with the Olympics linked to grievances between local and state actors suggests that an exacerbation of existing conflict leading up to a MISE may be a bigger risk than attacks during actual MISE games. The Munich attack of 1972 "required elaborate and long preparations" and drew upon deep rooted political grievances

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<sup>143</sup> Tracy Taylor & Kristine Toohey, "Perceptions of Terrorism Threats at the 2004 Olympic Games: Implications for Sport Events," *Journal of Sport & Tourism* 12, no. 2 (2007): 102 (with reference to Guy Sanan, "Olympic security operations 1972-94," in *Terrorism and the 2000 Olympics*, A. Thompson ed. (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1996).

<sup>144</sup> Richards, "Terrorism, the Olympics and sport," in *Terrorism and the Olympics*, 19.

<sup>145</sup> "GANEFO," *RAND* (1963), 13.

<sup>146</sup> Richards, "Terrorism, the Olympics and sport," in *Terrorism and the Olympics*, 19; Cha, "Beijing's Olympic-Sized Catch-22".

<sup>147</sup> Existing research has a tendency to fall back upon a terminology of "terrorist": "Experts suggested we should concentrate on the terrorists in order to understand the decision-making processes within their organizations." (Hafez and Rasmussen, "Terrorist Innovations," 7), "From a terrorists' perspective..." (Wilson *et al.*, "Securing America's Passenger-Rail Systems," 29), and "The authorities are constantly at the mercy of the ingenuity of the terrorist..." (Swain, "Securing the transport system," 81).

<sup>148</sup> Hickman *et al.*; McGovern and Tobin; Heath-Kelley.

<sup>149</sup> Gilmore, "The Real Olympic Challenge", 7.

to ensure support, and law enforcement agencies would not have been able to foil the plot without “some kind of inside information”.<sup>150</sup>

Terrorism is political violence that is normally a result of long term planning<sup>151</sup> and socio-politically situated senses of injustice that cannot be mitigated through a strict focus on traditional strategies.<sup>152</sup> Preventive and pre-emptive measures based in perceptions of “imminent”<sup>153</sup> disaster remain influential in security planning and have limiting consequences for action to combat insecurity. As discussed with relation to counterterrorism more generally, “imposing harsh criminal justice and military interventions to reduce terrorism may well be counterproductive”.<sup>154</sup> The Beijing 2008 Games were a success in that no major attack took place, but “criticism of the Chinese government’s suppression of internal dissent and extensive surveillance of its critical infrastructures and facilities”<sup>155</sup> do not point to full success in terms of “security legacies”. These have been defined as security technologies, new security practices, governmental policies and new legislation, externally imposed social transformations, generalized changes in social and transsocietal relationships, and urban redevelopment.<sup>156</sup>

The “look and feel”<sup>157</sup> factor referenced earlier from UK official discourse implicitly acknowledges the consequential intersection of discourse, perception, security, and insecurity. One example of how language has impacted counterterrorism more broadly is the way that “al Qaeda” as a threat identifier has “become a term of analytic convenience”.<sup>158</sup> This convenience factor is exacerbated by a reluctance to use similar levels of scrutiny to non-AQ-related threats,<sup>159</sup> with “jihadi extremism” now a kind of “obsession”<sup>160</sup> alongside an “Al Qaeda tunnel-vision effect”.<sup>161</sup> The OSSRA referenced earlier separates “crime, public disorder and domestic extremism” from “terrorism,” even though “domestic extremists” could be considered to engage in terrorism.<sup>162</sup> As concluded by Ashraf, “It would be helpful if those involved in Olympic security also developed a policy on terminology

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<sup>150</sup> Merari, “The Munich Olympics Attack, 1972”, draft, 10.

<sup>151</sup> Silke, “Understanding Terrorist Target Selection,” in *Terrorism and the Olympics*, 1.

<sup>152</sup> Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Introduction: Meeting and Managing the Threat,” in *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*, ed. Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 3.

<sup>153</sup> Ben Anderson and Peter Adey, “Event and anticipation: UK Civil Contingencies and the space – times of decision,” *Environment and Planning A* 43 (2011): 2885.

<sup>154</sup> “Efficacy of Counterterrorism Approaches: Examining Northern Ireland Project Title: Deterrence and Defiance Models of Terrorist Violence in Northern Ireland, 1969-1992,” Project Lead: Gary LaFree, Other Project Researchers: Raven Korte, Laura Dugan, START Research Brief, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, October 2006, 2.

<sup>155</sup> Jennings and Lodge, “Security and risk management for sporting mega-events,” 1.

<sup>156</sup> Giulianotti and Klauser, “Security Governance and Sport Mega-events,” 54.

<sup>157</sup> London 2012: Olympic and Paralympic Safety and Security Strategy, 11.

<sup>158</sup> Brian Michael Jenkins, “New Challenges to U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts,” 1.

<sup>159</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>160</sup> Richards *et al.*, “Towards an understanding of terrorism and the Olympics”, in *Terrorism and the Olympics*, 5.

<sup>161</sup> Richards *et al.*, “Critical reflections on securing the Olympics: Conclusions and ways forward”, in *Terrorism and the Olympics*, 229.

<sup>162</sup> London 2012 Olympic Safety and Security Strategic Risk Assessment and Risk Mitigation Process, summary, 4; See this separation also in “London 2012: Olympic and Paralympic Safety and Security Strategy”, 10.

appropriate for security assessments and for public relations. Otherwise, confusion and unintended offence will remain a possibility.”<sup>163</sup>

Emergency preparedness and some conventional measures can be useful. But a consideration of politically inclined strategies, such as dialogue and engagement, would perhaps provide a greater possibility for security in the short and long term.

#### 4. Conclusion

This report has presented a chronologically informed discussion of political violence, terrorism, and MISEs. By way of conclusion it is pertinent to reference the 2014 Sochi Olympics, 2018 World Cup in Russia, and 2022 World Cup in Qatar as case illustrations with which to consider the previous sections on MISE security planning.

##### 4.1 Case illustrations

Even without the successful World Cup bid, Qatar has been on a path to increased visibility and influence on regional and international levels.<sup>164</sup> It has been reported that in the next five years Qatar plans on spending \$100 billion “on infrastructure projects including road and rail networks as well as an additional \$900 million by 2013 for hospitality projects to cater to the rising population demands and the growing influx of tourists to the nation”.<sup>165</sup> With respect to the World Cup, “significant investments to secure and protect the country’s assets and create safer public spaces for civilians have become a top priority for both the public and private sectors”.<sup>166</sup> In addition to high financial investment is a seemingly conscious investment in how the Games are being framed in terms of identity, as seen in the following remarks following Qatar’s successful bid [emphasis added]:

HH Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, Emir of Qatar: “This achievement is a big one *for all Arab countries*”<sup>167</sup>

Sheikh Mohammad bin Hamad Al-Thani, Qatar bid chairman: “Thank you for acknowledging that this is the right time for *Middle East*.”<sup>168</sup>

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<sup>163</sup> Ashraf, “Al Qaeda and the London Olympics”, 33. See also Stuart Croft, *Securitizing Islam* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

<sup>164</sup> Al Jazeera based out of Qatar recent bought the broadcast rights to both the 2018 and 2022 FIFA cups: “The territories covered by this agreement are: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, UAE, Yemen and the territory of Palestine.” (Al Jazeera Sport [based out of Qatar] buys broadcast rights to 2018 and 2022 FIFA World Cups,” *FIFA* (26 January 2011) [cited 1 November 2012]; available from <http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/news/newsid=1371497/index.html>).

<sup>165</sup> “Public Safety and Security Summit”, updated 21 June 2011 [cited 1 Nov 2012]; available from <http://www.safetysecuritysummit.com/EventContent/Home.aspx?id=133>.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid.

<sup>167</sup> “Qatar 2022: Reactions,” *FIFA* (2 December 2010) [cited 1 Nov 2012]; available from <http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/qatar2022/news/newsid=1344979/index.html>.

<sup>168</sup> Ibid.

HE Sheikh Saud bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani, General Secretary of Qatar Olympic Committee: "Qatar has put football in the **Middle East** on the world stage."<sup>169</sup>

HH Sheikha Mozah bin Nasser Al Misnad: "I'm extremely happy because this win is not only for Qatar but **for the whole region**."<sup>170</sup>

Hassan al-Thawadi, Qatar 2022 bid chief executive: "You will be proud of **us and the Middle East**. This I promise."<sup>171</sup>

The FIFA 2022 World Cup does not just represent the first time that Qatar has been host, but the first time that the "*Middle East*" has been host: Qatar is "truly in the Middle, not in the East or West, and within reach for fans all around the globe".<sup>172</sup> Though a national focus has been asserted in particular ways, for example through the creation of Qatar's first "National" Sports Day,<sup>173</sup> the 2022 World Cup is framed as "Arab" and "Middle Eastern".<sup>174</sup> Thus even as the "decision to create a day dedicated to sport in Qatar is a symbol of the strong commitment of *our nation* toward developing sporting participation across the population [emphasis added]",<sup>175</sup> the response to hosting the 2022 World Cup has been more inclusive. In the words of Zinedine Zidane, awarding the role of host to Qatar was a "victory for the Arab world".<sup>176</sup>

These framings incorporating a regional identity focus hold potential benefits considering complex and sensitive political contexts by minimising polarising notions of national identities. By providing a nuanced yet inclusive sense of ownership, the festival of sport is promoted alongside the prestige of the region. However, the competition is still based on national teams whereby players represent particular states, and existing tensions in the region may surface in the context of sporting competition.

Two other upcoming MISEs are the 2014 Olympic Games and the 2018 World Cup, both of which take place in Russia. After Sochi<sup>177</sup> was named the host for the 2012 Olympics, a "spate of bomb attacks" was considered likely to be "the result of inter-clan and criminal competition for control over resources appearing in Sochi as a consequence of the massive construction projects required for Sochi to meet the challenge of hosting the Olympics", alluding to the impact of existing social and political relations.<sup>178</sup> Beyond such potentially criminal behaviour, the threat from actors that may

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<sup>169</sup> Ibid.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid.

<sup>171</sup> Ibid.

<sup>172</sup> BIDDERS FOR THE 2022 FIFA WORLD CUP, "Qatar" [cited 1 November 2012]; available from <http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/qatar2022/bidders/qatar.html>

<sup>173</sup> "Qatar celebrates National Sports Day", LOC (20 February 2012) [cited 1 November 2012]; available from <http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/qatar2022/news/newsid=1586793/index.html>.

<sup>174</sup> With thanks to Dr Gilbert Ramsay on flagging this possible dynamic early on.

<sup>175</sup> "Qatar celebrates National Sports Day" LOC (20 February 2012) [cited 1 November 2012]; available from <http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/qatar2022/news/newsid=1586793/index.html>.

<sup>176</sup> "Zidane: A victory for the Arab world," *FIFA* (2 December 2010) [cited 1 November 2012]; available from <http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/qatar2022/news/newsid=1345137/index.html>.

<sup>177</sup> It is worth noting here the relatively long-standing political conflict related to Chechnya. Chechen "insurgents" are cited as having "pioneered the use of the internet" and were "ahead of Al-Qaeda in filming their attacks, copying and distributing materials in a range of formats to a multi-lingual audience, using a range of technologies" (Hafez and Rasmussen, "Terrorist Innovations", 29).

<sup>178</sup> Gordon M. Hahn (writer/editor), "Islam, Islamism and Politics in Eurasia Report", Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program (MonTREP), Monterey Institute for International Studies, No. 16 (June 7, 2010), 6-7.

engage in political violence in Russia is not insignificant considering recent incidents and historical contexts. Insecurity in the Caucasus around Sochi is frequently linked to Dagestan. However, recent acts such as a 24 January 2011 bombing at Moscow's Domodedovo's airport that injured over 150 and killed 35 point to the continued<sup>179</sup> capability and intent of actors to engage in violence beyond the region.<sup>180</sup> According to Gordon Hahn, "There can be no doubt that the Caucasus Emirate (CE) mujahedin pose a threat to the 2014 Olympic games scheduled for Russia's southern resort city of Sochi."<sup>181</sup> Hahn references "the CE's growing global pretensions" as an indication of threat,<sup>182</sup> opening the door for government considerations of the broader motivations underlying possible violence to facilitate considerations of long-term options for conflict resolution. Though there was a decline in the efficiency of CE attacks in 2011,<sup>183</sup> and overall attacks in Russia were down from 396 to 238, these numbers are still relatively high. In looking at terrorism-related deaths in Europe and Eurasia in 2011, Turkey and Russia were reported as suffering close to 70% of all fatalities.<sup>184</sup>

The response of Russian officials to the role of host is somewhat different from that of Qatari officials. Vitaly Mutko, Russia's Minister of Sport and Chairman of the Russia 2018 Local Organising Committee (LOC) stated that the "cities chosen will be able to showcase in full our country's cultural and historical diversity".<sup>185</sup> This frames diversity in terms of "our" country, with a stronger emphasis on the national aspect of upcoming MISEs than seen in some press around the 2022 World Cup. In terms of mitigation, conventional security approaches were recently used by Russian state security forces "in an operation across the North Caucasus" in October 2012 that reportedly killed 49 militants.<sup>186</sup>

Considering conclusions that "any response to terrorism must be informed by an understanding as to what has caused it in the first place",<sup>187</sup> and this report's analytic observations on social and political context, it is highly unlikely that a strictly conventional security approach will ensure security before, during, or after a MISE.

#### 4.2 Observations

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<sup>179</sup> Previous attacks unrelated to MISEs but connected with these existing political tensions are the Moscow theatre hostage crisis and the Beslan hostage crisis that led to over 300 killed, at least half of which were children.

<sup>180</sup> Alexei Anishchuk, "Suicide bomber kills 35 at Russia's biggest airport", 24 January 2011, *Reuters* [cited 25 November 2012]; available from <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/24/us-russia-blast-airport-idUSTRE70N2TQ20110124>; "2011: The National Counterterrorism Center: Report on Terrorism," National Counterterrorism Center, Office of the Director of National Intelligence (12 March 2012), 19 (with reference to Hahn 2011, p. 10), explaining that 58% of CE's attacks in 2011 occurred in Dagestan.

<sup>181</sup> Hahn, "Islam, Islamism and Politics in Eurasia Report," 6.

<sup>182</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.

<sup>183</sup> Gordon Hahn, "SPECIAL REPORT: Jihadist and Islamist Trends in Eurasia in 2011, Part I", Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 5 (of "state agents").

<sup>184</sup> "2011: The National Counterterrorism Center: Report on Terrorism," 9.

<sup>185</sup> "Russia united for 2018 FIFA World Cup Host Cities announcement (LOC)" (29 September 2012) [cited 1 Nov 2012]; available from <http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/russia2018/news/newsid=1711839/index.html>.

<sup>186</sup> "Russian forces kill 49 militants in operation: state agency" *Reuters* (21 October 2012) [cited 30 November 2012]; available from <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/21/us-russia-militants-caucasus-idUSBRE89K04P20121021>.

<sup>187</sup> Richards *et al.*, "Critical reflections on securing the Olympics: Conclusions and ways forward", in *Terrorism and the Olympics*, 226.



As stated by Richards *et al.*, “Terrorism is a form of communication intended to send a message to target audiences.”<sup>188</sup> The time span of MISE planning has been cited as a challenge considering the demand to address possible threats many years in advance.<sup>189</sup> But if political, social and historical contexts are incorporated into planning, this timing is not so much a challenge as an opportunity. Though uncertainty is consistent across the majority of security planning for terrorism, the certainty of pre-existing conflicts holds significant potential for alternative mitigation strategies.

## 5. Future research

A starting question for this report was whether the 1972 Munich Olympics attack was the “first” major incident of terrorism against a MISE. As seen through the discussion in section two, it may be that political violence was not significant for MISEs before the mid to late 20<sup>th</sup> century. However, there are two possible limitations that may have influenced this finding, leaving space for future research into history, political violence, and sport. One limitation relates to database parameters, and the other relates to a hypothesised disconnect between the language used by researchers coding political violence today and the language used by actors that recorded incidents of political violence in the past.

Considering the first possible limitation, the RDWTI was itself a response to U.S. government demand following the 1972 Munich Olympic attacks.<sup>190</sup> The formation of this resource and the way that data was prioritised is connected with a particular historical moment and set of relationships. The GTD also benchmarks its data from 1970, and a large body of literature on terrorism more generally often positions terrorism as in a “new age” from around this time. These influences on data and perception are potentially significant limitations to how we understand political violence and respond to issues of security and insecurity.

The secondary limitation relates to the inconclusive nature of defining “terrorism”, and how the explicit use of “terror” in research is inherently problematic. An IED used by non-state or state actors to convey a political message during an international sporting event in the early 1700s would most likely not be categorized as “terrorism” considering the lineage of this particular term. However, in logical terms, this incident could quite easily be argued to be “terrorism” considering the way that violence was used: a search for “terrorism” in earlier centuries would not necessarily enable a comprehensive chronology of political violence and sport, and other research methods would be necessary.

Even acknowledging these limitations, some conclusions can be drawn. Sections one through four and appendices 1 and 2 suggest that levels of insecurity related to political violence and sport occur

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<sup>188</sup> Richards *et al.*, “Towards an understanding of terrorism and the Olympics”, in *Terrorism and the Olympics*, 4.

<sup>189</sup> Evidence-based Olympic Security Team, “Setting the Agenda for an Evidence-based Olympics,” 61.

<sup>190</sup> “In 1972, shortly after the terrorist attacks at the Munich Olympics and the Red Army attack on Lod Airport in Israel, the U.S. government formed the first official government body charged with fighting terrorism, the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism. This Committee asked RAND to examine recent trends in terrorism, prompting a team of RAND analysts to begin development of a database – the first of its kind – known initially as the RAND Terrorism Chronology.” [cited 2 Nov 2012]; available from <http://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/terrorism-incidents/about.html>.

in contexts distanced from MISE venues, and in places without a guaranteed audience beyond the immediate area. This points to a need for future research on sport and political violence more generally rather than a focus on specific MISEs. The growth in violence around sport in local communities within conflict/post-conflict settings more generally, and Iraq specifically, demands academic and practitioner attention. In the past five to ten years there has been a noticeable growth of insecurity against civilian targets connected with sport, irrespective of whether or not this insecurity is made known to a large international audience connected to a specific MISE.

In sum, future research is needed related to the context of violence identified as terrorism and MISEs to reorient perspectives on political violence and sport more generally to address insecurity within and beyond MISEs.

## Appendix 1

### Incidents of terrorism and political violence from a search of “Olympic”<sup>1</sup> and “World Cup”<sup>2</sup>

Date	City	Country	Perpetrator	Weapon	Injuries	Fatalities	Description
5 Sep 1972	Munich	Federal Republic of Germany	Black September	Firearms	0	11 via RWDTI, 16 via GTD	“Eight Palestinian guerrillas broke into the Israeli quarters at the Olympic Games in Munich, killed two Israeli athletes and took nine others hostage. The guerrillas demanded the release of 200 Palestinians imprisoned in Israel and safe passage for themselves and their hostages to another country. In subsequent negotiations, Israel rejected the kidnappers' demands, but the West German government agreed to give the terrorists and their hostages safe passage to Egypt... In the ensuing gunfight [at the airport], five of the terrorists and all nine of the hostages were killed, several of them when one of the terrorists tossed a hand grenade in one of the helicopters carrying the hostages. Three of the terrorists were captured and later freed (see October 29, 1972 incident). The BSO claimed responsibility... Israelis raided refugee camps in Lebanon on February 21, 1973, and killed 31...downed a Libyan airliner that strayed over Sinai, killing 107 aboard. The Palestinian leader...[Abu Daoud] was released by the French in 1977, and flown to Algeria...”
6 Oct 1972	Algiers	Algeria	Unknown	Unknown	0	0	“Palestinian students entered the West German consulate...held several hostages...demanding release of three Arab terrorists held for participation in...the Munich [attack]. The students left the consulate and the hostages were freed an hour later.”
8 Oct 1976	Beirut	Lebanon	Other	Firearms	1	0	“Ali Hassan Salamah, believed to be the Black September planner of the Munich Olympics attack, was...shot...a [sic] long a Beirut street. The Israeli secret service was believed responsible.”
9 June 1978	Lisbon	Portugal	Other	Explosives	0	0	“A bomb was detonated at the Argentine embassy in Lisbon. The Action Group for Communism left a paper at a Portuguese news agency...in protest of the killings and imprisonment by the Argentine government and had been timed to coincide with the World Cup soccer games.”
22 Jan 1979	Beirut	Lebanon	Other	Remote-detonated explosive	18	10	Ali Hassan Salamah (aka Abu Hassan), “Palestinian guerrilla leader who reportedly planned the attack...at Munich in 1972 was fatally wounded in Beirut in the explosion of a remote-controlled bomb...Wafa, the Palestinian news agency, charged Israeli intelligence with responsibility...”
1 May 1980	Paris	France	Other	Unknown	5	0	“A group of young people attacked the Soviet news stand...destroyed publications and wounded five...who were distributing tracts in favor of the Olympic Games. Credit for the action has been claimed by the Jewish Defense Organization, until the present time unknown to the police.”
1 Aug 1981	Warsaw	Poland	Other	Firearms	3	0	“Abu Daoud, a Palestinian guerrilla leader reputed to have masterminded the 1972 Munich Olympics [attack]...was shot...by a young gunman who fired five bullets then calmly walked out of the hotel.”

<sup>1</sup> Only two attacks took place during the Olympics.

<sup>2</sup> Search performed 2 Nov 2012 from <http://www.rand.org/hsrd/projects/terrorism-incidents/about.html>. All text cited directly from the RDWTI unless otherwise indicated.

26 August 1983	San Salvador	El Salvador	Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)	Firearms	0	1	Salvadoran Olympic Committee/Army, colonel Jose Larios Guerra (GTD)	
21 August 1986	Amsterdam	Netherlands	Into the Blue Commando of the Revolutionary Cells	Explosives	0	0	Headquarters of 1992 Olympic Games candidature committee (GTD)	
12 Oct 1987	Peshawar	Pakistan	Other	Explosives	13	0	“A bomb went off in the main bus terminal...blamed on Afghan's secret agents, and occurred at a time when security had been stepped up for the world cup cricket matches which were being held in Pakistan.”	
13 July 1989	Jerusalem	Israel	“Palestinians”	Tear gas	3	0	“celebration, Jewish Olympic Games” (GTD)	
24 May 1992	Barcelona	Spain	ETA	Incendiary	0	0	5 star hotel in Olympic Village (GTD)	
17 July 1994		Djibouti	Unknown	Grenade	15	4	field where football fans were watching world cup final (GTD)	
17 July 1994	Annaclore	Northern Ireland	Ulster Freedom Fighters	Automatic firearm	7	0	Hawthorne Inn, “40 patrons at pub watching world cup final” (GTD)	
27 July 1996	Atlanta	United States	Other	Explosives	111	1	“knapsack, filled with three pipe bombs surrounded by nails, detonated at Olympic Park in Atlanta, during the 1996 Summer Olympic games...perpetrator, Eric Robert Rudolph, placed a warning call to authorities about an hour before it exploded. Rudolph, a right-wing extremist, was also responsible for three other bombings in the American south between 1996 and 1998... In April 2005, Rudolph made the following statement, “...the purpose of the attack on July 27 was to confound, anger and embarrass the Washington government in the eyes of the world for its abominable sanctioning of abortion on demand. The plan was to force the cancellation of the Games, or at least create a state of insecurity to empty the streets around the venues and thereby eat into the vast amounts of money invested.” <sup>390</sup>	
3 July 1997	Lomas Aisladas	Colombia	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)	Hostage	0	1	Targeted Russian Olympic Committee, Cyclist Vasili Lujkina (GTD)	
31 August	Athens	Greece	Anti-Authority	Explosives	0	0	Targeted Greek Olympic committee (GTD)	

1997			Group						
1997	Aintree	England	IRA	Coded bomb warnings	0	0			Aintree Grand National abandoned after call in from suspected IRA (Paul Coslett, "Aintree evacuated," <i>BBC</i> (updated 7 April 2007) [cited 2 November 2012]; available from <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/liverpool/content/articles/2006/12/01/local_history_aintree_1997_feature.shtml">http://www.bbc.co.uk/liverpool/content/articles/2006/12/01/local_history_aintree_1997_feature.shtml</a> ).
2 Feb 1998	Narita	Japan	Revolutionary Workers' Council (Kakurokyo)	Explosives	1	0			"Three trench mortars were fired at Narita Airport... The attack may be related to the Nagano Winter Olympic Games which begin in a week. Karuokyo, a leftist group, claimed responsibility for the attack."
11 May 1998	Paris	France	Unknown	Explosives	0	0			"A bomb was discovered at...France Telecom...a gas cylinder filled with nuts and bolts is of the same type as those used by Islamists for bomb attacks in 1995. The attack comes one month prior to the World Cup."
12 July 1998	Kampala	Uganda	Unknown	Explosives	3	1			People "watching a World Cup soccer final were injured in two sequential bomb blasts".
1 May 2002	Madrid	Spain	ETA	Car bomb	17	0			ETA detonated two car bombs, one outside Bernabau stadium before a Champions League match between Real Madrid and Barcelona ("Bomb threat at Bernabeu stadium" <i>BBC</i> (updated 12 December 2004) [cited 10 January 2013]; available from)
30 Sep 2003	Athens	Greece	Unknown	Fire or Firebomb	0	0			"A PASOK (ruling political party) office was attacked with a firebomb in Anthoupolis... This is one of five explosive attacks that took place around Athens on this evening. Authorities believe the attacks were perpetrated to express solidarity with defendants in the November 17 terrorism trial. A new group, calling itself the Labor Association for Social Rebellion-Post Midnight Slalom [LASRMS] claimed responsibility... the group states, "For as long as you burn forests, we will burn your offices, for as long as you burn brains, we will burn your homes." The group also condemned the upcoming Olympic games..."
30 Sep 2003	Athens	Greece	Unknown	Fire or Firebomb	0	0			"A firebomb detonated outside the apartment building of George Vetsos, a university professor and close friend of the Greek Prime Minister... This is one of five explosive attacks that took place in Athens on this evening.. The group [LASRMS] also condemned the upcoming Olympic games and expressed solidarity with November 17 members."
20 Feb 2004	Thessaloniki	Greece	Indomitable Marxists	Fire or Firebomb	0	0			"Three gas canister devices were thrown at a car used by a high-ranking employee of the European Center for the Development of Vocational Training (CEDEFOP)... Indomitable Marxists claimed the attack, stating... the real murderers of the state and of the capital continue to murder many workers in the biggest terrorist operation that has ever been set up in Greece, the Olympic Games."
26 Feb 2004	<i>Not indicated</i>	Greece	Unknown	Fire or Firebomb	0	0			"Unknown perpetrators planted small gas cylinders in two vans that were being used by the Ministry of the Environment, Physical Planning and Public Works... A caller claimed responsibility for the attack and stated Fivos and Athina (Olympic mascots) assume responsibility for this action. It is in protest at the official visit of the IOC (International Olympic Committee) members to Athens, and the forced labor camp of the Olympic Games, where workers are being murdered."
9	Thessaloniki	Greece	Revolutionary	Fire or	0	0			"A group calling themselves the Revolutionary Torch-Bearing Run claimed responsibility for causing

March 2004				Torch-Bearing Run	Firebomb				a fire at the Masoutis supermarket with a Molotov cocktail...In their claim of responsibility the group writes, In this society of triumph, of money, and merchandise, when everyone prostitutes or becomes a prostitute with their head down, we continue to submit the vote of revolutionary fire and endless rage. Resistance to the Olympic Games. Freedom to the accused in the 17N case and ELA (People's Revolutionary Struggle)."
26 March 2004	Thessaloniki	Greece	Anti-Olympic Flame	Fire or Firebomb	0	0	0	0	"A group calling themselves Anti-Olympic Flame claimed responsibility for an arson attack...In their claim of responsibility, the group wrote, "We are asking young people to welcome the terrorism of the Olympic Games with a relay race of destruction and arsons against symbols of the state, against the commercial society and every authority."
12 April 2004	Thessaloniki	Greece	Anti-Olympic Flame	Fire or Firebomb	0	0	0	0	"Unknown arsonists destroyed the vehicle of Deputy Consul of Cyprus, Panagiotis Georgiades...explosion was caused by gas canisters which were placed underneath the car. The 'Anti-Olympic Flame' group claimed responsibility for the attack and stated, "in Greece and Cyprus and Turkey the enemies are to be found in banks and ministries. Let us crush the patriotic garbage on both sides of the Aegean."
5 May 2004	Athens	Greece	Revolutionary Struggle	Explosives	0	0	0	0	"Three explosive devices detonated in succession at a police station...100 days before the start of the Olympics. On 13 May, the Revolutionary Struggle claimed responsibility...the group writes, with regard to the Olympic Games, "we say that Greece's transformation into a fortress, NATO's involvement, the presence and activities of foreign intelligence units show clearly that (the Olympics) are not a festival like Games organizers say, but it's a war."
13 May 2004	Athens	Greece	Unknown	Explosives	0	0	0	0	"An explosive device, consisting of gas canisters, detonated outside a branch of the Alpha Bank... This attack comes only a few months before Greece is to host the Olympics."
19 May 2004	Athens	Greece	Popular Revolutionary Action	Explosives	0	0	0	0	"A small time bomb was found and safely defused at a Land Rover dealership...only a kilometer from one of the biggest Olympic sites in Athens. The Popular Revolutionary Action (LEDh) claimed responsibility...writes, "every strike against British interests is not a blow to the edges of the imperialist block (such as Italy, Spain and other allies of the counter-terrorism campaign), but to the heart of the beast."
22 July 2004	Athens	Greece	Unknown	Explosives	0	0	0	0	"Two petrol bombs were thrown at the Greek Culture Ministry in Athens, only a few weeks before the start of the Olympic games."
11 Dec 2004	Alimos	Greece	Popular Revolutionary Action	Explosives	0	0	0	0	"A homemade explosive device, made of a 9-volt battery, a timer and a detonator, was found outside the Olympic Construction Company in Alimos...The group, Popular Revolutionary Action, claimed responsibility...stated that it attacked this group for participating in construction activities for the Olympic Games in the summer of 2004."
17 Jan 2005	Basra	Iraq	Unknown	Firearms	0	1	0	0	"A candidate of the Iraqi National Accord Movement was killed in Basra by unidentified gunmen. Ala Hamid Nashih also worked as a clubs official at the Olympic Committee in Basra."
25 June 2005	Madrid	Spain	Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA)	Explosives	0	0	0	0	"A car bomb exploded next to the Peineta sports stadium...currently under construction, in an effort for a Madrid bid for the 2012 Olympic Games."
4 July 2006	Dusa Mareb	Somalia	Islamic Tendency	Firearms	4	2	0	0	"Somali Islamists shot two people at a cinema in Dusa Mareb, Somalia, as they tried to shut down a screening of the World Cup. No group claimed responsibility for the attack." (GTD)
15 July	Baghdad	Iraq	Unknown	Firearms	0	0	0	0	"The Iraqi Olympic Chief was kidnapped in Baghdad, Iraq. The perpetrators of this incident were

2006								unknown and so was the result of this incident. No claim of responsibility was reported.” (GTD)
3 Sep 2006	Baghdad	Iraq	Unknown	Firearms	0	0		“Militants kidnapped Ghanim Ghudayer...a member of Iraq's Olympic soccer team...In July, Iraq's national soccer coach and his assistant resigned after receiving death threats and gunmen kidnapped the chairman of Iraq's National Olympic Committee along with fifty other officials.
6 Oct 2006	Baghdad	Iraq	Unknown	Firearms	0	1		“Gunmen shot and killed Nasir Shamil, the former captain of the Iraqi volleyball team...Attacks on sports figures are not uncommon in Iraq: members of Iraq's soccer team and Olympic committee have recently been targeted.”
2 Dec 2006	Unknown	Iraq	Unknown	Firearms	0	3		“Gunmen kidnapped Ahmed al-Hijjiya, the chairman of Iraq's Olympic committee and at least 30 others while they attended a conference....Many athletes were reportedly targeted because of their perceived links with the US-led allies. No claim of responsibility was reported.” (GTD)
16 Dec 2006	Baghdad	Iraq	Unknown	Firearms	0	1		“Gunmen kidnapped Mahoud Ahmed Fulayih, the coach of Iraq's Olympic cycling team, from his home in Baghdad...He was abducted after returning with the team from the Asian Games in Doha.”
7 Mar 2007	Port of Spain	Trinidad-Tobago	Unknown	Other	9	0		“A tear gas attack at a Hilton hotel...during warm up matches for the 2007 Cricket World Cup...”
January 2008	Dakar	Senegal	Not indicated	Not indicated	Not indicated	Not indicated		Dakar rally reported cancelled due to terrorist threat (Levy, “Top Ten”)
11 June 2008	Yiwu	China	Unknown	IED	35	1		“...around 2004, an explosion of a man-made bomb occurred at a public square...a well known trading hub and gathering place for migrant workers...No group claimed responsibility” (GTD) (“The “Doubt Terrorism Proper: Purely Criminal Act” was included as the available sources stated that police believe that the bombing was deliberate, but not a terror attack as the bombing coincided with counterterrorism drills occurring to prepare for the Olympics.”)
14 June 2008	Qara Tappah	Iraq	Al Qaeda	Remote-detonated explosive	34	0		“a woman suicide bomber targeted a crowd of soccer fans celebrating Iraq's win over China in a World Cup qualifier near a cafe”
21 July 2008	Kunming	China	Turkestan Islamic Party	Explosives	7	2		“at 07:10, a bomb equipped with ammonium nitrate and a time-delay detonator exploded aboard a Chinese bus...the first of two bomb blasts which took place within 60 minutes on board Chinese buses... Some residents received phone text messages in the early hours of Monday, warning Kunming residents to avoid buses hours before the bomb explosions took place. The Kunming blasts came less than three weeks prior to the Beijing Olympics and two days after Yunnan police opened fire and killed two rubber farmers in the Menglian province during a clash that also saw 41 police officers injured. On 08/04/2008, the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) released a video claiming responsibility for the double bomb blasts, although Chinese authorities rejected the claim.” (GTD)
21 July 2008	Minshan	China	Turkestan Islamic Party	Explosives	7	1		“at 08:10, a bomb equipped with ammonium nitrate and a time-delay detonator exploded aboard a Chinese bus at the Minshan bus stop...the second of two bomb blasts which took place within 60 minutes on board Chinese buses in Kunming.” (GTD)

4 Aug 2008	Kashgar	China, People's Republic of	Other	Explosives	16	16	“Two Uyghur men drove a truck into paramilitary police and then attacked them with bombs and knives...According to Agence France Presse, 70 members of the People's Armed Police (PAP) were jogging in the city of Kashgar... Witnesses claimed that the assailants were wearing clothes which resembled police or PAP uniforms. China's state news agency Xinhua reported that the assailants were immediately arrested...Although, it has not claimed responsibility for the attacks, a group called the Turkistan Islamic Party had previously threatened to attack the Beijing Summer Olympics.”
4 Aug 2008	Qinhuangdao	China	Unknown	Unknown	0	0	“at an unspecified time, in Beijing, China, a suspected improvised explosive device was reported to have been found in the Qinhuangdao Stadium where the Olympic football matches were due to be held...There were no claims of responsibility” (GTD)
7 Aug 2008	Sochi	Russia	Unknown	Explosives	4	2	“a package exploded on a beach in Sochi, near Abkhazia, on August 7, 2008. It is unclear who is responsible for the attack. Sochi will host the 2014 Winter Olympics and is one of Russia's most popular beach resorts. It is located closed [sic] to the disputed breakaway region of Abkhazia, Georgia”
9 Aug 2008	Beijing	China	Unknown	Armed Assault	1	1	“at an unknown time, in Beijing, China, a knife-wielding assailant attacked an American family [attending the Olympics]...There were no claims of responsibility made” (GTD)
10 Aug 2008	Kucha	China, People's Republic of	Other	Explosives	5	4	“attacked a county public security...between 3:20 am and 4 am as security personnel and police officers were on their way to deal with other attacks. The assailants drove a motor tricycle through the gate and detonated the tricycle's gas tank. The explosion killed two of the attackers... the explosives used on August 10 were built from bent pipe, gas canisters and liquid gas tanks. These attacks followed an attack on paramilitary police in Xinjiang's Kashgar city on August 4...Although, it has not claimed responsibility for the attacks, a group called the Turkistan Islamic Party had previously threatened to attack the Beijing Summer Olympics.”
10 Aug 2008	Kucha	China, People's Republic of	Other	Explosives	1	0	“homemade bombs at...the Office of Industry and Commerce, between 3:20 am and 4 am. Xinhua reported that the attackers traveled by taxi and one of them was injured while throwing the explosives out of the car window...as public security personnel and police officers left the Kucha county public security bureau to deal with this and other attacks, other assailants attacked the public security bureau. Xinhua reported that all the attackers who had been identified were Uyghurs and that the explosives were built from bent pipe, gas canisters and liquid gas tanks...Note: Radio Free Asia reported that more than one government building had been attacked...Although, it has not claimed responsibility for the attacks, a group called the Turkistan Islamic Party had previously threatened to attack the Beijing Summer Olympics.”
10 Aug 2008	Kucha	China, People's Republic of	Unknown	Explosives	0	0	“Unidentified assailants attacked one or more businesses...between 3:20 am and 4 am...Xinhua reported that supermarkets and hotels were bombed. Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported that Han Chinese-owned stores were attacked...attackers who had been identified were Uyghurs, they traveled by taxi and the explosives were built from bent pipe, gas canisters and liquid gas tanks...Although, it has not claimed responsibility for the attacks, a group called the Turkistan Islamic Party had previously threatened to attack the Beijing Summer Olympics.”
10 Aug 2008	Kucha	China, People's Republic of	Other	Explosives	0	2	“Two assailants detonated suicide bombs in a market in western China...between 3:20 am and 4 am. Xinhua reported that all of the identified attackers were Uyghurs and that the explosives were built from bent pipe, gas canisters and liquid gas tanks...Although, it has not claimed responsibility for the attacks, a group called the Turkistan Islamic Party had previously threatened to attack the Beijing Summer Olympics.”



							Summer Olympics.”
12 Aug 2008	Kashgar	China, People's Republic of	Unknown	Knives & sharp objects	1	3	“An unidentified assailant jumped from a vehicle at a security checkpoint...second attack to occur in or near Kashgar. Ta Kung Pao newspaper identified those were killed as two militia men and a local cadre and it identified the injured individual as a deputy secretary of the Communist Party branch of a local village...Although, it has not claimed responsibility for the attacks, a group called the Turkistan Islamic Party had previously threatened to attack the Beijing Summer Olympics.”
13 Aug 2008	Qinhuangdao	China	Unknown	Unknown IED	0	2	“at an unknown time, in Beijing, China, a suspected improvised explosive device reportedly functioned in a building in the Qinhuangdao economic and technological development zone. Two people were reportedly killed in the incident. Olympic organizers stated that the incident was related to production activities. The two people killed are thought to have worked for the Changpu company. There were no claims of responsibility” (GTD)
2008	Colombo	Sri Lanka	<i>Not indicated</i>	Suicide bombing	<i>Not indicated</i>	12	Suicide bomber attacks start of marathon killing 12 “including former Olympic marathon runner and national athletics coach” (Richards, 21); “The dead included Jeyaraj Fernandopulle, the minister of highways; Olympic marathoner K.A. Karunaratne; and coach Lakshman de Alwis, the government said.” (Associated Press (via ESPN), “Sri Lanka coach, former Olympic marathon runner killed in suicide attack” (6 April 2008, ) [cited 12 November]; available from <a href="http://sports.espn.go.com/oly/trackandfield/news/story?id=3332232">http://sports.espn.go.com/oly/trackandfield/news/story?id=3332232</a> )
March 2009	Lahore	Pakistan	<i>Not indicated</i>	Armed assault	8	7	Sri Lankan cricket team convoy attacked by a coordinated assault of militants using AK-47s, grenades, rocket launcher (missed), during early hours so some shops not open and presumably less damage than could have been otherwise (Randeep Ramesh and Haroon Siddique, “Day of cricket that turned into 30 minutes of terror: Dozen gunmen escape after assault on convoy carrying Sri Lankan team to stadium,” <i>Guardian</i> (4 March 2009) [cited 12 January 2013]; available from <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/04/pakistan-cricket-terror">http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/04/pakistan-cricket-terror</a> ).
August 2009	Hyderabad	Pakistan	<i>Not indicated</i>	<i>Not indicated</i>	N/A	N/A	English badminton team withdrew from World Championships due to threat of terrorism
1 Jan 2010	Laki Marwat	Pakistan	<i>Not indicated</i>	Suicide bomber	“dozens”	88	Suicide bombing at volleyball match by militant in northwest Pakistan (daily volleyball matches, not a specific event).
January 2010	<i>Not indicated</i>	<i>Not indicated</i>	Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (Flec)	Armed attack (ambush)	<i>Not indicated</i>	3	Togo football team convoy came under attack after entering Cabinda area of Angola before the Africa Cup of Nations. Interestingly, FLEC leader Rodrigues Mingas expressed condolences for the attack days later: ““This attack was not aimed at the Togolese players but at the Angolan forces at the head of the convoy,” Mingas told France 24 television. “So it was pure chance that the gunfire hit the players. We don't have anything to do with the Togolese and we present our condolences to the African families and the Togo government. We are fighting for the total liberation of Cabinda.” (James Sturcke, Paul Myers, and David Smith, “Togo footballers were attacked by mistake, Angolan rebels say,” <i>Guardian</i> (11 January 2010) [cited 3 November 2012]; available from <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jan/11/two-arrested-togo-football-attack">http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jan/11/two-arrested-togo-football-attack</a> ).
13 June 2010	Afgoye	Somalia	Hizbul al Islam (Somalia)	Unknown, kidnapping (10)	0	2	“at 0000...militants entered a home and fired upon and killed two youth who were attempting to escape and took another 10 civilians hostage for watching the Argentina-Nigeria World Cup soccer game on television...one of two related kidnappings...The Islamic party of the group Hizbul al Islam

				hostages), armed assault					claimed responsibility for the attack claiming that the men violated Islamic law. The status of the hostages is unknown.” (GTD)
13 June 2010	Afgoye	Somalia	Hizbul al Islam (Somalia)	Kidnapping	0	0			“heavily armed militants entered a home and kidnapped 30 civilians for watching the Germany-Australia World Cup soccer game on television...one of two related kidnappings...No group claimed responsibility, but the group Hizbul al Islam is thought to be responsible for the attack.” (GTD)
8 July 2010	Mogadishu	Somalia	Unknown	Grenade	2	1			“unidentified assailants threw a grenade at a group of young people watching the world cup, killing one person and injuring two others” (GTD)
11 July 2010	Kampala	Uganda	Al-Shabaab	IED	35	60			“around 2230, in one of two related attacks, at the Kyaddondo rugby grounds in Kampala, Kampala province, Uganda, unidentified assailants detonated an improvised explosive device targeting a group of civilians watching a World Cup soccer game...al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attack. Thirty-six individuals have been charged in connection with the bombings.” (GTD)
11 July 2010	Kampala	Uganda	Al-Shabaab	IED	36	15			“around 2230, in a restaurant in the Kabalagala suburb of Kampala, Kampala province, Uganda, in one of two related attacks unidentified assailants detonated an improvised explosive device targeting a group of civilians watching a World Cup soccer game... al-Shabaab claimed responsibility” (GTD)
16 June 2011	Quetta	Pakistan	Unknown	Firearm	0	1			“gunmen on motorcycles opened fired with unknown weapons onto a former Olympic boxer ...No group has claimed responsibility for the attack” (GTD)

## Appendix 2

### Incidents of terrorism and political violence from a search of “soccer”<sup>3</sup>

Date	City	Country	Perpetrator	Weapon	Injuries	Fatalities	Description
9 June 1978	Lisbon	Portugal	Other	Explosives	0	0	“A bomb was detonated at the Argentine embassy in Lisbon. The Action Group for Communism left a paper at a Portuguese news agency which said the bombing was in protest of the killings and imprisonment by the Argentine government and had been timed to coincide with the World Cup soccer games.”
3 March	Brussels	Belgium	Other	Firearms	3	2	“A man wielding a submachine gun opened fire on a group of Yugoslav soccer fans watching television at a cultural center in Brussels...The Belga news agency said an exile group from

<sup>3</sup> Search of “soccer” in the RDW TI performed 2 Nov 2012 via <http://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/terrorism-incidents/about.html>. All text cited directly from RDW TI unless otherwise indicated.

1982							Yugoslav's Kosovo region claimed responsibility for the attack, but a spokesman for the group denied any involvement...
13 May 1994	Buenos Aires	Argentina	Unknown	Chemical Agent	3	0	"A tear gas grenade exploded in the Japanese Embassy in Buenos Aires...in protest of Japan's refusal to grant a visa to an Argentinian soccer star. Pamphlets of the People's Revolutionary Organization (ORP) were found nearby, however, they deny involvement."
12 July 1998	Kampala	Uganda	Unknown	Explosives	3	1	Three were injured and one killed while watching a World Cup soccer final between Brazil and France after an explosion went off. A secondary bomb scare occurred 13 July when "a suspicious briefcase was sighted". <sup>4</sup>
8 March 1999		Turkey	Unknown	Explosives	0	0	"A worker at the Ali Sami Yen soccer stadium discovered a half-unpinned grenade under a paving stone."
24 April 1999	Kampala	Uganda	Unknown	Explosives	16	5	"A bomb planted outside a soccer stadium...followed on the heels of a shooting incident in the same area, which brought numerous police personnel investigating the crime to the immediate vicinity of the subsequent bombing...no link was established between the shooting and the bomb attack"
21 May 1999	Belfast	Northern Ireland	Unknown	Explosives	3	0	"A hand grenade was lobbed at the Red Devils Pub, a bar frequented by Manchester United soccer fans. The device exploded outside the bar and injured three men who were walking by, none seriously...no group has claimed responsibility. Authorities are blaming loyalists for the attack."
29 Oct 2000	Dhanbad	India	Unknown	Firearms	3	4	"Four police officers were killed when extremists began firing indiscriminately on a crowd during the distribution of a prize at a soccer match. Authorities believe that Saba Ahmad, the Bihar Education Minister, who was in attendance at the match, was the target of the attack."
27 July 2001	Giv'at Ze'ev	West Bank/Gaza	Unknown	Firearms	0	1	"Palestinian gunmen shot and killed an Israeli teenager from their car after firing onto a soccer field where Israelis were playing. None was injured, but two went into shock."
1 Aug 2001	Lhokseumawe	Indonesia	Free Aceh Movement (GAM)	Remote-detonated explosive	0	0	"During a match between two sub-district teams contesting the North Aceh Mayor's Cup, two homemade explosive devices detonated at the Rasasakti soccer stadium in Lhokseumawe, Aceh...The Free Aceh Movement (GAM) is presumed responsible for the attacks."
14 Nov 2001	Buenaventura	Colombia	Unknown	Firearms	0	2	"A semi-retired journalist was gunned down in his home while watching soccer...paramilitaries are suspected. Four other journalists have been placed under federal protection this week after receiving death threats from a paramilitary group."
3 Aug 2002	Dublin	Ireland	Unknown	Other	3	0	"Three Basque separatists...wrecked the Spanish flag, neon light and soccer flag hanging in the restaurant and injured two cooks and the son of the restaurant's owner."
17 Nov 2002	Vladikavkaz	Russia	Unknown	Remote-detonated explosive	0	0	"Two explosions occurred within seconds of each other at a soccer stadium in Vladikavkaz, about an hour after a soccer match had taken place. One device had been planted under a sewage manhole cover near the entrance to the stadium, and the second device was nearly 50 feet away

<sup>4</sup> Details on this incident taken from "July 11 bomb blasts: History repeats itself", *The Observer* [cited 26 December 2012]; available from [http://observer.ug/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=9257&Itemid=59](http://observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=9257&Itemid=59).



25 Aug 2006	Balad Ruz	Iraq	Unknown	Explosives	3	3	“A makeshift bomb exploded on a soccer field in Balad Ruz, killing three teenage boys and wounding three others. Two other bomb attacks on soccer fields in Iraq took place earlier in August. All three likely had sectarian motivations.”
3 Sep 2006	Baghdad	Iraq	Unknown	Firearms	0	0	“Militants kidnapped Ghanim Ghudayer, a popular Iraqi soccer star considered to be one of the best players on Baghdad's Air Force Club team. Ghudayer was also a member of Iraq's Olympic soccer team.”
15 Sep 2006	Fallujah	Iraq	Unknown	Explosives	6	4	“A bomb placed in a football (soccer) field in Fallujah exploded, killing four people and wounding six others... Insurgents have targeted football fields in the past, as they often attract large groups of Iraqis, particularly children.”
23 Sep 2006	Igdir	Turkey	Kurdish Workers Party (PKK)	Explosives	17	0	“The Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) claimed responsibility for a truck bomb attack in Igdir...four of the injured were professional soccer players, in town for a match.”
6 Oct 2006	Baghdad	Iraq	Unknown	Firearms	0	1	“Gunmen shot and killed Nasir Shamil, the former captain of the Iraqi volleyball team, in front of his jewelry shop in the Al-Mansur area of west Baghdad. Attacks on sports figures are not uncommon in Iraq; members of Iraq's soccer team and Olympic committee have recently been targeted.”
30 Nov 2006	Baqubah	Iraq	Unknown	Explosives	0	0	“A car bomb exploded near the Diyala sports field in Baqubah, however did not result in casualties. Insurgents often target public areas, such as soccer fields, where people congregate.”
2 Feb 2007	Benchoud	Algeria	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb	Explosives	2	0	“A bomb exploded in the municipal stadium of Benchoud during a soccer match... Authorities believe the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), now known as the al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb, is responsible for the attack.”
6 Feb 2007	Benchoud	Algeria	Unknown	Firearms	0	1	“The mayor of Benchoud was assassinated outside his home. The attack was the second to occur in Benchoud in four days. The first occurred at the soccer stadium. No one has claimed responsibility for the attack...”
1 March 2007	Ramadi	Iraq	Unknown	Firearms	0	2	“Gunmen shot and killed Muhammad Hammed Nawaf and Muhammad Meshaan, soccer players for the Ramadi soccer club, in front of their teammates after accusing them of opposing militant activity.”
31 March 2007	Baghdad	Iraq	Unknown	Explosives	2	0	“A militant threw a grenade onto a soccer field in the Zafaraniyah neighborhood of Baghdad, injuring two children.”
29 May 2007	Yala	Thailand	Unknown	Firearms	1	0	“A twenty-eight-year-old former community police volunteer in Lamai tambon, Wicha Tohka, was shot in his right knee and foot. He was returning from a soccer game on his motorcycle when he was attacked... The current insurgency has been underway since January 2004 and more than 2000 people have perished from the violence.”
3 June 2007	Yala	Thailand	Unknown	Explosives	17	0	“A bomb blast at a school in southern Thailand's volatile Yala province wounded seventeen young Muslim men. The men, aged between twenty-three and thirty, were waiting to play a game of soccer when the bomb went off beside a sports field.”
14 June 2007	Pattani	Thailand	Unknown	Remote-detonated explosive	14	0	“A bomb exploded at a soccer field in southern Thailand's turbulent Pattani province... Police say that the bomb was detonated by cell phone.”

21 July 2007	Mosul	Iraq	Unknown	Firearms	0	2	“Terrorists killed a policeman and a civilian in a café in Mosul. The attack occurred while the victims were watching the Iraqi soccer team beat Vietnam in the Asian Cup quarter-final on television.”
25 July 2007	Baghdad	Iraq	Unknown	Explosives	75	30	“Terrorists killed thirty civilians and wounded at least seventy-five when their suicide car bomb detonated. The attack took place in downtown Baghdad while the civilians were celebrating the Iraqi national soccer team victory in Al Rowad square in a Mansour neighborhood. It is believed that Sunni militants were responsible for the attack.”
26 July 2007	Mosul	Iraq	Unknown	Unknown	0	0	“Terrorists attacked Mosul's main soccer stadium. They destroyed half of the 10,000 seat structure. It is unclear what the motivation for the attack was.”
30 July 2007	Baghdad	Iraq	Unknown	Explosives	12	6	“Another victory for the Iraqi national soccer team was followed by another celebration by spectators in the streets that ended in tragedy...Several of the victims were celebrating Iraq's 1-0 victory over Saudi Arabia in the Asian Cup.”
6 Aug 2007	Khalis	Iraq	Unknown	Unknown	0	0	“Baha Abdul Karim Darweesh, the goalkeeper of the Kirkuk soccer club, was kidnapped.”
27 Oct 2007	Jharkand	India	Communist Party of India-Maoists	Firearms	4	17	“Maoist rebels attacked a group of soccer spectators in a village in Jharkand state, killing 17. Some 150 people had gathered in the village to enjoy a cultural event after a soccer match...”
19 Nov 2007	Baqubah	Iraq	Unknown	Remote-detonated explosive	4	3	“Three children were killed and four others were wounded when militants detonated a bomb at a soccer field in Baqubah. The bombing occurred as children were playing soccer near a public playground. This was the second attack on Iraqi children that day.”
30 May 2008	Baqubah	Iraq	Unknown	Explosives	2	1	“A child was killed and two other children were wounded when one of them picked and explosive device that went off. The children were playing soccer when in Baqubah when the incident took place.”
14 June 2008	Qara Tappah	Iraq	Al Qaeda	Remote-detonated explosive	34	0	“a woman suicide bomber targeted a crowd of soccer fans celebrating Iraq's win over China in a World Cup qualifier near a café in Qara Tappah (north of Baghdad)...”
21 June 2008	Baydhabo	Somalia	Unknown	Remote-detonated explosive	10	0	“Unidentified assailants tossed a grenade into a cinema in Somalia's Baydhabo as people were watching a soccer game.”
13 July 2008	Duluyiah	Iraq	Al Qaeda	Firearms	3	2	“Unidentified gunmen fired on a soccer game near Duluyiah, killing a policeman and a member of the local U.S.-backed Awakening Council group. The attack also wounded three others, including a nine year old and a second member of the Awakening Council group. It is more likely that the Awakening Council group members were the target of this attack. Al Qaeda has targeted such members for their cooperation with the U.S.”

## Appendix 3

### Glen Levy, “Top 10 Worst Sport Terrorism Attacks”, *TIME Specials*

1. “Cricket Chaos”
2. Black September
3. Atlanta’s Anguish
4. Sticky (Deadly) Wickets
5. It’s <i>Not</i> Just A Game
6. Madrid Melee
7. Post-9/11 Fears
8. False Start
9. Marathon Massacre
10. Gentlemen, (Don’t) Start Your Engines <sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Cited 1 September 2012; available from <http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/completestlist/0,29569,1882967,00.html>.